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The first chapter (with Richard Arnott) considers an atomistic developer who decides
when and at what density to develop his land, under a property value tax system charac-
terized by three time-invariarrt tax rates: ry, the tax rate on pre-development land value;
rg, the tax rate on post-development residual site value; and r11, the tax rate on structure
value. Arnott (2002) identified the subset of property value tax systems which are neutral.
This paper investigates the relative efficiency of four idealized, non-neutral property value
tax systems [i) "Canadian" property tax system: Tv :0, Ts : TK; ii) simple property tax
system: 'tV : TS : rx; iii) residual site value tax system: TK : O,'rV : rS; iv) differentiated
property tax system: 'rv : Ts ) rg ) 0] under the assumption of a constant rental growth
rate.
The second chapter adds to the controversial literature on private annuities. First, I
explore whether growing up in a rich family can make someone more patient and, therefore,
more prone to annuitize. Second, I draw from recent literature in psychology on the problem
of "overconfidence", and argue it could apply to someone's estimation of his or her life
expectancy and hence to his or her propensity to annuitrze. I find that appealing to these
kinds of explanations does little to explain why relatively few people purchase annuities at
the point of retirement.
The third chapter examines whether a parent's illness causes adult children to provide
their parents with financia,l assistance. Using the Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHAS),
I find that mother's health status matters for transfers from children, but father's health
status has no impact on transfers. These results are consistent with the theory that children
care for their parents because they may be expecting them to provide childcare to their own
children.
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Chapter 1
The Property Tax as a Tax on
\Ialue: Deadweight Loss
1.1 Introduction
Through the centuries land and real property taxation have taken many forms. Land has
been taxed on the basis of area, foot frontage, and agricultural rent generated. And real
property has been taxed on the basis of the number of windows, chimneys, or balconies,
property rents, and estimated property values, among other things. A central tradeoffin the
choice of how to tax land and structures is between efficiency and ease of tax collection. Foot
frontage is easy to measure but taxing foot frontage gives rise to long, narrow lots; taxing
the number of windows is simple but leads to windows being bricked up in structures built
before the tax was imposed, and tc structures built subsequently having a small number of
large windowsl and so on.
In the Anglo-Saxon countries at least, the dominant debate today vis-i,-vis land and real
property taxation concerns the choice between land/site value taxation, property value tax-
ation, or some hybrid. The defining difference between these taxes concerns the tax base of
deueloped properties: under property taxation, the assessed market value of the developed
property is taxed; under site value taxation, the tax base subsequent to development is the
imputed value of the land; under differentiated property taxation, the imputed values of
land and structure are both taxed but at different rates. The same tradeoff occurs. Site
value taxation in its purest form is non-distortionary, but subsequent to development mea-
suring such site value is fraught with difficulty. At the other extreme, property taxation is
relatively easy to apply since property values can be estimated quite accurately from market
transactions, but is distortionary 
- 
encouraging inefficiently low capital intensity in con-
struction. Confronted with this tradeoff different jurisdictions have made different choices.
Property taxation is the norm in North America; in mainland China, site value taxation
is employed; while Australia and New Zealand (and Pittsburgh) have chosen differentiated
property taxation.
An essential element of the debate entails quantifying the deadweight loss associated
with the various forms of property taxation.l The traditional analysis due to Cannan
(1899, reprinted 1959) and Marshall (1961) has two distinctive features. First, it is partial
equilibrium, analyzing the effects of taxing a single property in isolation. Laud is treated as
being completely inelastic in supply, so its taxation is non-distortionaryl a building is treated
as perfectly-elastically-supplied, so its taxation is distortionary. The second distinctive
feature of the Marshallian analysis is that it treats the taxes as falling on rents rather than
- 
as is actually the case 
- 
on values. The deadweight loss generated by the structure
component of the property tax can then be portrayed diagrammatically as a conventional
deadweight loss triangle.
lThis paper follows the literature in using "property taxation" in two senses: as a generic term for
the wide variety of systems of taxing land and buildings, and for the specific form of taxation in which a
developed properby G taxed on the basis of its market value. Hopefully, the usage will be apparent from the
context.
One line of subsequeut work (most notably, Mieszkowski (1972)) has analyzed property
taxation from the perspective of static, general equilibrium theory i la Harberger. In the
basic variant of the model, the structure component of the property tax is viewed as a tax
on capital in the building sector. A more sophisticated variant recognizes that different
jurisdictions tax property at different rates. The auerage rate of the structure component
of the property tax is viewed as a tax on capital in the building sector, and jurisdiction-
specific deviations in the tax rate from the average rate as generating excise tax efiects.2
This branch of the literature continues in the Marshallian tradition by treating the taxes
as falling on rents rather than on values.
Another line of subsequent work retains Marshall's partial equilibrium perspective but
employs a dynamic analysis 
- 
specifically capital asset pricing theory 
- 
and treats the
taxes as falling on values rather than rents. Shoup (1970) investigated the effect ofproperty
taxation on a developer's choice of when to construct a fixed project on a vacant lot, taking
the time path of rents as given. Arnott and Lewis (1979) extended Shoup's analysis to
allow for variable building density. Capozza and Li (1994) subsequently investigated how
these results are modified by uncertainty, with rents being generated by an exogenous
stochastic process. A closely related group of papers has focused on the neutrality of site
value taxatic'r. A neutral tax does not alter the developer's choice of timing or 'Jensity,
and therefore generates no deadweight loss. The first three papers (Skouras (1978), Bentick
(1979), and Mills (1981)) came to the unorthodox conclusion that site value taxation is
distortionary. It was subsequently shown that this result hinges on how post-development
site value is defined. Once an immobile and durable building is constructed on a site, the
of conditions under which the2Hamilton (1975) introduces zoning into this model, and lays out a set
property tax becomes a non-distortionary benefits tax.
market provides a valuation for the property (site and building together) but not separate
valuations for the site and the building. Thus, post-development site value must be i'mputed.
Skouras, Bentick, and Mills all defined post-development site value as property value mimrs
structure value, which is now termed residual site value, and hence showed that residual
site value taxation is distortionary, discouraging density. Tideman (1982), following Vickrey
(1970), demonstrated that the orthodox conclusion that site value taxation is neutral is
restored if post-development site value is instead defined as '\vhat the market value of the
land would be if there were no building on the site (though in fact there is)"; this alternative
definition is termed raw site value. The policy debate these papers spawned (e.g., Netzer
(1998), Tideman (undated), and Mills (1998)) has concentrated on the practicability of
employing either definition; in particular, how might post-development residual site value
and raw site value be estimated in practice, and how accurate would such estimates likely
be? The majority view is that residual site value could be more easily and accurately
estimated than raw site value. Less accurate estimation would not only result in a tax
system that was perceived as more capricious'and hence less fair, but would also likely lead
to more corruption in assessment and more wasteful litigation in assessment appeals. Thus,
the central tradeoff is between the greater efficiency of the raw site value tax and the lower
administrative costs (broadly speaking) of the residual site value tax. And the magnitude
of the deadweight loss associated with residual site value taxation is an essential element of
the debate.
This paper contributes to this strand of the literature by investigating the d,ead,weight
loss associated with alternative property tax systems, treating the taxes as taxes on values
rather than rents and in a partial equilibrium context. More precisely, it considers the
subset of property tax systems that can be characterized by three time-invariant tax rates
- 
one on pre-development land value, a second on post-development structure value, and a
third on post-development residual site value. And for this subset of property tax systems,
it relates the deadweight loss from taxation applied to the single property to the three tax
rates, as well as to the time path ofrents, the form ofthe structure production function, and
the interest rate. Particularly neat results are obtained for the "Canadian" property tax
system, which exempts land prior to development from taxation and then taxes property
value subsequent to development (hence taxing post-development residual site value and
structure value at the same rate, r). Under the simplifying assumptions that agricultural
rent is zeto andthat floor rent grows at a constant rate r:,, it is shown that the present value of
property tax revenues is maximized by setting the post-development property tax rate equal
to the growth rate offloor rentl a higher property tax rate puts taxation on "the wrong side
of the Laffer curve". The marginal deadweight loss associated with the revenue-maximizing
tax rate is, of course, infinity. At lower tax rates the marginal deadweight loss is shown to
be rl(q 
- 
r); if therefore floor rent grows at two percent, the application of a one percent
property tax (i.e., one percent of property value) generates a 100% marginal deadweight
loss 
- 
the marginal dollar of tax revenue collected has a social cost of two dollars. In 1985,
the average effective property tax rate in the City of Torontc for residential (six storeys or
less) housing was 1.1% and for multi-family residential (more than six storeys) 4.2To3 , white
the annual growth rate in real apartment rents in the Toronto CMA between 1979 and 1989
was less than one percent.4 These observations suggest that the Toronto property tax has
3Sourcer Calculated from Ontario Ministry of Municipal Afairs and Housing, Municipal Analysis and
Retrieval System (MARS) Database.
asource: CMHC Rental Market Surveys. Over the period the rental growth rates on bachelor, one'
bedroom, two-bedroom, and three-bedroom apartments were .84Vo, .907o, I.O0% and .93%.
been highly distortionary. Similar results are obtained for many other jurisdictions.s
Such back-of-the-envelope calculations are, ofcourse, subject to numerous qualifications,
but do indicate 
- 
as its critics have argued 
- 
that some forms of property taxation may
be very inefficient, and accordingly that switching to less distortionary but administratively
more costly forms of property taxation merits serious policy consideration.
Section 1.2.1 introduces the basic model in the absence of taxation. The rest of Section
1.2 introduces property taxation, and derives the general formulae for the present values
of tax revenue collected and of deadweight loss. Section 1.3 applies the results to four
broad classes of property tax systems, employing numerical examples. Section 1.4 presents
qualifications, discusses possible extensions, and concludes.
1.2 Theory
Since the theory is developed at length in a companion paper (Arnott [2002]), its presenta-
tion here will be compact.
L.2.L The model in the absence of taxation
The model is essentially that presented in Arnott and Lewis [1979]. An atomistic landowner
o\Mns a unit area oi undeveloped land. He must decide when to develop the land and at
what density (floor-area ratio). Once built, the structure is immutable; no depreciation
occurs and no redevelopment is possible. He makes his decisions under perfect foresight.
To simplify even further, it is assumed that the interest rate, the price per unit of capital,
sFisher and Peters (1998), Table 4.3, provides data on the lowest and highest effective property tax rates
in 1992 for a sample of cities within a state, for a selection of states. Indiana's figures are 3.72To, 4.3970;
lowa's 4.23Vo, 4.68To; arrd Minnesota's 4.8Iyo,5.30%. Thus, the effective property tax rate for Toronto is by
no means an outlier.
and the structure production function are invariant over
development generates no rent. The following notation is
time, and also that land prior
employed:
to
T
K
time (t 
- 
0 today)
development time
capital-land ratio
AW) structure production function
r(t) rent per unit floor area at time
(Q')o,Q"<o)
t 
- 
floor or structure rent
r(t)A6)e-itdt 
- 
pKe-ir
* i,pK) e-t'r 
- 
0
interest rate
p price per unit of structure capital
The structure production function indicates how many units of structure are produced
when y'{ units of capital are applied to the unit area of land. For concreteness, one may
think of Q as the number of units of rentable floor area per unit area of land (floor-area
ratio), or less precisely but more intuitively as the number of storeys in the building (which
assumes an exogenous coverage ratio).
The developer's problem in the absence of taxation is6
r4aI rI(7, K)T.K\/
The first-order conditions are
T:
K:
r
-J,
K)"<Q-n& 
- 
n\ 
"-0,/
(-r(r)AW)
/foo(, rQ)Q'(
(1. 1)
-0.
(1.2)
(1.3)
values are6We assume throughout
finite.
that exogenous variables and parameter values are such that asset
FOCr
FOCy
(r.2)
Figure 1.1: First-order conditions without taxation
Eq. (1.2) states that, l( fixed, development time should be such that the marginal benefit
from postponing construction one period (the one-period opportuuity cost of construction
funds) equal the marginal cost (the rent forgone). Eq. (1.3) states that, T fixed, capital
should be added to the land up to the point where the increase in rental revenue due to an
extra unit of capital, discounted to development time, equal the unit price of capital.
Figure 1.1 portrays the first-order conditions in T-K space. Both first-order conditions
are positively-sloped, and the second-order conditions for an interior maximum require that
rents be growing at development time and that the first-order condition for ? be steeper than
that for -I{ (which, with a constant rate of rental growth, is equivalent to the requirement
that the elasticity of substitution between land and capital in the production of structure be
less than one). Multiple local interior maxima are possible and might indeed occur due to
cyclical fluctuations, but to simplify the analysis we assume that there is a unique interior
maximum, which is the global maximum.
We shall have occasion to use several different asset values. To simplify notation, we
write these values on the assumption that development takes place at the profit-maximizing
development time and density; for example, we write P(t) for post-development property
ualue instead of P(t; T*, K*).
Post-development property value is
(1.4)
Some property tax systems (e.g., Australia, New Zealand and Pittsburgh) tax post-development
structure value and post-development site value at different rates. Because of the spatial fix-
ity of structures, land and structure value are not separately observable after development.
Thus, post-development structure and site values arc imputed values. The literature on the
neutrality of land value taxation has analyzed two different concepts for post-development
land or site value. The first, residual s'ite ualue, denoted by ^9(t), equals property value
minus (depreciated 
- 
though here no depreciation is assumed) structure value:
f@P(t)- | r@)a6)e-i(u-t)d,u, t>7.Jt
s(r) 
-P(t)-pK, t>7. ( 1.5)
(1.6)
The second raw site value, denoted by E(t), is what the land would be worth at time f were
it vacant, even though in fact it is developed:
fc
max If(q,k(q Jf(t) (Rt'r)r(f) ,(u)Q e-i(u-t)d,u - pR(De-ie(D-t), t > T"
where f14 is the profit-maximizing development timeT conditional on the land being unde-
veloped at time t, and, frft) the corresponding profit-maximizing capital-land ratio. Since no
depreciation is assumed, post-development structure aalue is simply pK. Pre-development
Iand ualue is
v(t)
Because development
f6I
-t,
occurs
r(u)A6)e-i('-t)du 
- 
pKe-i(r-t), t <7. (1.7)
(1.8)
at the profit-maximizrng time and density,
vg-)-s(T+)-r(r+).
L.2.2 The model with taxation
In what follows we ignore the taxation of raw site value since in our opinion the difficulty
of estimating it would render its taxation impractical. We should, however, note that
a hypothetical property tax system which taxes pre-development land value and (post-
development) raw site value at the same rate, and exempts (post-development) structure
value from taxation, is neutral 
- 
does not affect the developer's choice of development time
and density, and hence entails no deadweight loss. Since the developer's tax liability over
time is independent of her choices, raw site value taxation is lump sum and so does not
a,ffect her decisions.
We restrict our analysis to the class of property tax systems characterized by three
7By defitritioo, f@ > t. With smoothly growing rents, if the land remains undeveloped after the profit
maximizing development time has passed (t ) ?), conditional on the land being undeveloped at time t it is
profit-maximizing to develop it right away, in which case i1t1 : t. It is possible, however, that the housing
market is in a slump at time f so that even though the profit-maximizing development time has passed,
conditional on the land being undeveloped at time t it is profit maximizing to develop later, in which case
flty>t.
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time-invariant tax rates: the tax rate on pre-development land value, ry; the tax rate on
post-development residual site value, rg; and the tax rate on post-development structure
value, ry . We shall examine four different types of property tax systems. Under a simple
rates on pre-development land value andproperty tax system, Tv 
-
post-development residual
Ts 
- 
T6 
= 
Tli the tax
site value and structure value are all the same. Ijnder a C anad'ian
property tax system,ry : 0, r,9 : TK 
= 
z"; property is untaxed prior to developments, while
after development property value is taxed, which is equivalent to taxing post-development
residual site value and structure value at the same rate. Under a resid,ual site value tax
system Tv : Ts : rr, with rx : O; pre-development land value and post-development
residual site value are taxed at the same rate while post-development structure value is
exempt from taxation. Finally, a differentiated property tax system is like the common
property tax system, except that the common tax rate on pre-development land value and
post-development residual site lalue is higher than that on post-development structure
value: rg:Tv=ry)rylO.
The rest of this section treats the general case. In the next section, we shall explore
the properties of the above four different types of property tax systems using numerical
examples.
We first derive the asset valuation formulae and the corresponding fitst-order conditions.
Post-development residual site value is
8under the property tax systems in most Canadian provinces, pre-development agricultural land is taxed
on the basis of what it would be worth if it were held in agricultural use forever. Under our assumption that
land prior to development generates no rent, this corresponds to a zero tax rate on pre-development land
value.
11
s(r)
which has the solution
which, employing
f@
- 
| ,@)A(ne-i(u-t) d,u - pK -Jt
f@ :/-. r\ f@
r@ " 
J, s(") e-i(u-t) du - 'o J, PKe
Jt
V (")e-i(u-t) d,u,,
yields
-i,(u-t) gu
-i(u-t) d,u.
-(i,*rv)Q-t)
Differentiation with respect to t yields
^9- -rQ + (i, * rrc)pK + (i,* rs),S,
f@
s(r)
Jt
(1.e)
(1.10)
( 1. 11)
( 1. 12)
Thus, the tax on structure value increases the cost ofcapital by the tax rate on structure
value, while the tax on residual site value increases the post-development discount rate by
the tax rate on residual site value. Pre-development land value equals
v(t) - TTs(r) e-i(r-t) -* Ir"
the procedure above and using (1.8),
If6
v(t) 
-VTlJ, (r(")AW) - Q,+ rx)pK)" -(i,*ril@-Td")e
Hence, the pre-development land value tax increases the pre.development discount rate by
the tax rate on pre.development land value.
The developer chooses 7 and 1{ so as to maximize (1.12). The first-order conditions are
L2
TK
: [-rg)Q6)
l- roo /
: | | (,@)QLJT \
+ (i,* rx)pK + (qs
' (K) 
- 
(i * rx)o) 
"
- 
rv)Vg))e-Q'*rv)Q-t) 
- 
0
-(i'*r)@-D at1 
"-u'*rv)(r-t) - o.l
( 1. 13)
(1.14)
Eq. (1.13) states that optimal development time occurs when the marginal benefit from
postponing development one period equals the marginal cost. The marginal benefit equals
the savings from postponing construction cost one period, which equals construction costs
times the user cost of capital, 'i * rs, plus the savings in site/land value tax payments,
Gs -rv) Iz("). The marginal cost equals the rent forgone. Eq. (1.14) states that capital
should be added to the site up to the point where the discounted rent attributable to the
last unit of capital equals the discounted value of the user cost, with the discount rate equal
to the interest rate plus the tax rate on post-development residual site value.
FOCT
FOCy
(1. r4)
T
Figure L.2: First-order conditions with taxation
The effects of each of the three tax rates on profit-maximizing development time and
(1.13)
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density can be derived with the use of Figure 1.2 which is the same as Figure 1.1 except
for the presence of property taxation. \Me assume that rents are "on averagett rising over
times. Under this assumption, the geometric implications of the second-order conditions
are qualitatively the same aa for Figure 1.1. Consider first ry. From (1.13), #1. :
"'v l(1.13)
v(r) 
' {-cm (1.14), the assumption that rents are on average rising over time
-rQ)Q' 6)+(i+rr<)p1 "'
implies that the denominator is positive. A rise in the pre-development land value tax
rate therefore causes (1.13) to shift up. From (1.14), #1.,,..:0. Thus, as intuition
",v t(1.14)
suggests, a rise in the pre-development land value tax rate causes earlier development at
lower density. These and the other comparative static results with respect to T and K are
recorded in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1
Comparative static effects of tax rates on development time and density
Note:*Building earlier at higher density can be ruled out.
Since the inefficiency due to a property tax derives from "how far from neutraltt the
property tax system is, it is of interest to characterize neutral property tax systems. For
most of the oaper, we shall focus on the special but central case where floor rent grows at a
constant rate. For this case, Arnott (2002, Prop. 2) gives the result that: When floor rent
grows at a constant rate q, a neutral property tax system has the properties that
/n\rK : rs \-rT * _ ,) rv :0, (1.15)
and provides two different intuitive explanations. The first is casual, the second exact.
rv TS rK
T ?t( ?*
K ?* ?*
L4
A residual site value tax system (rs :'rv ) 0,111 :0) has no effect on the development
timing condition (see (1.13)), but by increasing the discount rate causes the development
density condition to shift down, resulting in earlier development at lower density. Take
this as the starting point and consider how zy, rg and 16 should be modified to restore
neutrality. First, capital should be subsidized to ofiset the depressing effect of residual
site value taxation on development density. But from (1.13), the subsidization of capital
advances development by reducing the marginal benefit from postponing development. The
development timing condition, which was undistorted with residual site value taxation,
becomes distorted, leading to e>rcessively early development. This can be corrected by
setting the pre-development land value tax rate below the post-development site value tax
rate. This intuition suggests that a neutral property tax system has rs ) ry and q4 ( 0.e
The precise intuition is that the tax system described in (1.15) is equivalent to a site rent
tax system with a time-invariant tax rate (post-development site rent is defined as rent net
of amortized construction costs) which is neutral. Thus, how distortionary a property tax
system is depends on how far it deviates {rom site rent taxation at a constant rate.
L.2.3 Deadweight loss
Define Y(t) to be the discounted (and brought forward) social surplus from the site, eval-
uated at time l. This equals the discounted social benefit from the site, which equals the
discounted revenue it generates, minus discounted construction costs. Thus,
Y(t) -i(u-t) d,u _ pKe-iQ-t) (1.16)
but not generally. SeeeThis intuition is correct for the special case of a constant growth rate of rents,
Appendix 2 to Arnott [2002].
[* r@)Q@)"JT
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Letting b denote the pre-tax situatior,
loss from the site evaluated at tim e t:
a the after-tax situation, and D(t) the deadweight
D(t) 
-Yb(r) - Y"(t).
The social surplus from the site accrues to landowners, in the form of land value less
brought-forward tax payments (before development) or property value less brought-forward
construction costs less brought-forward past tax palnnents (after development), L(t), and
to the government, in the form of discounted (and brought-forward) tax revenues, fl(t).
Hence.
Ybft) 
- 
LbQ)
(1.17)
( 1.1s)
( 1. 1e)
( 1.20)
Y"(t)-La(r)+R(t)
D(t)
Eq. (1.20) indicates that deadweight loss may be calculated as the loss in landowner surplus
mi.'rus tax revenue.
With a tax on pre-development land value, the value of tax revenue collected depends
on when the tax was first imposed. Let f (< ? and possibly < 0) represent this date, and
R-(t) denote the value of tax revenue collected prior to development. Then
16
Let R+ (t) denote
/ ;T ., .\ \o
l* J, v@)e-i(u-'1 a")
/ 1T . \,- \ . \o
("" 
"ut J , 
V g)"-(i'*rv)Q-") u-i" au)
(rrirrg i- (i,+ rv)V from(1.12))
/ ,. \m pT \o
lr, "otv g) "- 
(i'+rvY 
J, e'v " o" )
(, frle-i(r-') (t - e-rvT-I)))"
the value of the revenue collected after development. Then
(1.21)
R+e) : ("" ll ,u"-i(u-t)uu.* ll s61"-ot"-oau)"
: ( lf r@)e(K)e-i(u-7:)4u - pK -stry] "-,,t-'l)" {,,.i,,s (1.e))
: y"(t) 
- 
(v{r1"-i,<,-o])" (using(1.16) andv(T):,s(r)) . (r.22)
Also,
( 1 .23)
The landowner's pre- and post-tax present-value surpluses are10
losuppose 1: 
-oo, rvT is finite and ryl : -cr. Then, from (1.23) and (1.25),R(t): Y"(t) andL"(t) :0. If, furthermore) Tv, zs, and zr are aII small, then the government expropriates the entire surplus
from the site with no distortion. The first result states that if the government initially imposes the pre.
development land tax infinitely far into the past at a rate such that tyl : 
-cr, it expropriates the entire
surplus from the site. The second result indicates that this expropriation can be achieved with essentially
no distortion if additionally the tax rates are sufficiently small. The practical relevance of this neutrality
result is open to question!
Lb$) (r.24)
L7
and
L" (t) 
-
(using (L.21)). ( 1.25)
In evaluating property tax systems, we assume that there is currently (, : 0) no property
tax system in place and a choice is to be made concerning what property tax system to
apply from today forward. This choice would be uninteresting if the site is already developed
since property taxation would then have no real efiects. Thus, ue eramine the effer.ts of a
property tar system applied to an unileaeloped, si,te from tod,ay on.ll This conceptual exercise
has two important implications. First, if the profit-maximizing development time computed
per (1.13) and (1.14) is positive, then the pre-development land value tax is first applied
today, i.e. .I : 0. Second, if the profit-maximizing development time computed per (1.13)
and (1.14) is negative, then (1.13) is replaced by the condition that development will occur
at the most profitable time from today foruard,.
The equations derived earlier in this subsection were general. We now particularize them
to the conceptual exercise we are performing. Let f denote profit-maximizing development
time computed per (1.13) and (1.14), andT ) 0 denote the profit-maximizing development
time from today forward.
If.f > 0, the following system of equations applies: (1.16), (1.17), (1.18, 1.19, 1.20) with
f:0, and
llThere is a problem with our conceptual exercise. Consider two property tax systems A and B. Choosing
between the t*o tax systems today, A is preferred to B. However, if the choice were to be made ten
years from now, B might be preferred to A. Such time inconsistency could arise if, for example, both tax
iystems yielded the same profit-maximizing development time and density, but tax system A gene-rated more
discountidrevenuethanBfromt:0onwhiletaxsystemBgeneratedmorediscountedrevenuefromt:10
on.
(rfrle-i(r-.)) _ rc-(t)
(, frle-i(r-D e-'vz-4)
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(tfol (u'"r - 1))" (1.26)
zz+(o) 
- 
yo(o) 
- (rffl 
"-ur)" (r.27)
R(o) :Yo(o) 
- (r€1" -(i,*rv,U) - Yo(o) - (v(o))" ( 1.28)
LbQ) (r.2e)
( 1 .30)
Itf < 0, the following system of equations applies: (1.17), (1.18, 1.19, 1.20) with t:0,
and
v (0) r (u) A W) 
"-iudu - pKe-r ( 1.31)
e-rvr))" : (rtol ("""' -'))" ( 1.32)
7z+(o) 
-Yo(o) - (rfft"-o')" ( 1 .33)
rz(o) 
-Yo(o) - (rrrl" -(i*ry)r) : Yo(o) - (v(o))" ( 1.34)
LbQ) ( 1 .35)
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L"(0\: (y1f1"-Q+"v)r)" : y"1g'y
\ 
\J 
) "
In all the examples we shall consider, when f ( 0, f :0.
Since by assumption no tax revenue is raised before f, : 0, whether f
landowner surplus at t :0 equals land value at t:0 : .C (0) : 7(0). Thus,
(1.36)
from (1.20)
D(o) : vb(o) 
- 
v" (o) 
- 
7?(o)
vb(o) 
-vo(o) +7?(o) +D(o),
l2The general relationship is Lb (t) : L" (t) + R(t) + D(t).
L" (t) + R(t) + D(t). Thus (nineteen) applies when V" (0)
collected prior to T 
- 
0.
( 1.37)
which states that today, immediately afber the imposition of any form of property taxation,
land value plus discounted tax revenue plus discounted deadweight loss equals land value
prior to taxation.12
The analysis obtains the deadweight loss from applying alternative property tax systems
to a particular site in isolation. Extending the analysis to determine the efficiency of alter-
native tax systems applied to an entire jurisdiction requires a fuller model which accounts
for the heterogeneity of sites as well as (unless the jurisdiction is completely open) for the
endogeneity of rents. Thus, the reader should be cautious not to over-interpret the paper's
very partial equilibrium analysis.
Also in general, Vb(t) 
- 
Lo(t), so that Vb(t) :
20
1.3 Four Property Tax Systems
Throughout this section we shall assume that structure rents grow at a constant rate q
over time, which considerably simplifies the analysis. To simplify the algebra, we ignore the
complications which arise when f a O; we do, however, take account of these complications
in our numerical examples. To further simplify notation, we omit the superscript a on
after-tax variables, when there is no danger of ambiguity.
With this assumption, from (1.12):
v(t)- rnex l'g)aT) -+pK1 
"-u*rv)Q-t)\/ T,K L?+rS-q i+TS- J
The corresponding first-order conditions are
( 1.38)
( 1.3e)
(1.40)
(r.41)
r , f- i:'{ - ?r(nA6) * U'+ Tv) U'.trx) pKl 
"-o*rv)e-t) - 0L i+rS-?'\*/'P\'-/ (i+rs)
l- /rK , I rQ)Q'(K) - 'i * rx I ,-(i+'ril (r-t) - 0.
Lr+ rs-rt t+rse)e
Dividing the two first-order conditions yields
Q@) 
- 
'i*rv
Q'(K)K i+rv-rt
By the second-order conditions, the elasticity of substitution of Q is less than one. Since
Q lQ' K is therefore increasing in K, (1.41) implies that profit-marimizing structural d,ensi,ty
decreases wi,th rv and is independent of rs and, 16. Thus, we may write I( : K(rv) with
K' <0. Letting 16 : r(0), (1.39) and (i.al) imply
2L
r : !r" f !i t'"Xi l,'q -'i)P1 , e.42)
n'^^ L (z + rs)rsQ' (K(rv)) )'
which indicates that profit-maximizing development time increases with ry and rs and
decreases with ry. The second-order conditions, 4 ) 0, Q" ( 0, and o 1 I, guarantee that
there is a unique maximum, which is interior. These results are of sufficient importance
that we record them in:
Proposition L.l If the rate ol rental growth is constant and if the second-order cond,itions
of the deueloper's profit-madrnization problem are satisfied, then: i) d,euelopment d,ensity is
d,ecreasing in ry and, ind,ependent of rs and ry; ii) d,euelopment time increases with rs and
rx and and, d,ecreases with ry.
Following the discussion of the previous section, we shall take I : 0. Then from (1.23),
(1.16), and (1.38):
R(o) 
- f"trl a@) (+- "-""'=) -pK (t-L '\i-q i*rs-rt/ ' \
Finally, from (1.16) and (1.17):
i*rx
'i*rs -iT (1.43)
rv") 
] e
D(0)
r\ i'-q /
We now consider four idealized prope
have referred to as the Canadian property
analyze.
\
- 
PK I e-t'r '/
We start with
the neatest and
"-n'lI
rty value
tax syste
(,Q)Q6)
\ i-?
tax systems.
m, since it is
(1.44)
what we
easiest to
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1-.3.1 Canadian property tax system (ru :0, T.s : ry 
= 
r" ) 0)
Many Canadian provinces and some U.S. states tax agricultural land on the basis of what it
would be worth if it were held in agriculture forever (Youngman and Malme (1993)). Since
pre-development land rent in our model is zero, application of such a tax system would
result in no tax liability prior to development, which corresponds to ry :0. It can be seen
from (1.39) and (1.40) that this property tax system causes both the timing and density
first-order conditions to shift down, and from (1.41) in such a way that development occurs
at the same density as in the absence of taxation but at a later date 
- 
as displayed in
Figure 1.3.13 That density is unaffected by the property tax system considerably simplifies
the calculations. Fbom $.a\:
To:Tb +1 r, (l'+r"-q\q \ ?,-q /
From (1.43), the discounted revenue raised from the tax is
R(0) r@)AW)r"€-ir(i-ri\*r"-ri'
From (1.3S) and (1.39:
( 1.45)
( 1.46)
(1.47)
(1.48)
vb(0) L\ ?'-q
Substituting (I.47) and (1.45) into (1.46)
R(o)-vb(o) (ffi)
")
yie
"-ir lqr?)Q6) o-irL r(i-ri v
lds
(31r
l3This result was first demonstrated in Arnott and Lewis (1979).
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From (1.38):
Then from (1.37):
(1.3e))
( 1.4e)
(1.50)
re a enu e - rn ar?,nx?, z?,n g
e-ir_(ffi) (?) "-ir (using
(using (1.45) and (1.47)).
bFOCr
Figure 1.3: The Canadian property tax system
Two results are of sufficient interest that we record them as:
Proposition I.2 Under the Canad'i,an property tar system: a) The
tar rate'is r"- rl. b) The marg'inal deadwe'ight loss (MDWL) 'is ft
Proof :
24
FoIIows directly from (1.18).
MDWL: Wffi.The result then follows di,rectly from (1.48) and, (1.50) .l
The results are so simple that there should be a simple explanation of them; so far,
however, an incisive explanation has eluded us.1a
Part a) of Prop. 1.3.2 is interesting since it suggests that jurisdictions in which the
rental growth rate is less than the property tax rate may be on the wrong side of the Laffer
curve. Part b) suggests that the Canadian property tax system can be highly distortionary
at even modest tax rates.
We now present a numerical example. We choose units so that Kb : Qb :1, assume
that i, :.03 and n : .02, and choose ro : .024731 and p :2.2408 so that development in
the no-tax situation occurs at Tb :50 and Vb(O; : 1.
Table 1.2
Numerical example with Canadian property tax
T K T v(o) 
- 
f(o) 7?*(o) 
- 
7?(o) D(0) MDWL
0 1 50 1 0 0 0
.01 1 84.7 .354 .530 . 116 1.0
.02 1 104.9 .T92 .5( ( .230 oo
.03 1 119.3 .r25 .563 .3r2
-3.0
Notes: i) recall that under our assumption that no tax revenue is collected prior to
f : 0, y(0) : a(0); ii) recall (1.37), that the imposition of taxation at t :0 does
not change y(0) + R(0) + 2(0) and; iii) a marginal deadweight loss of 
-3.0 implies
that as the tax rate is raised on the wrong side of the La.ffer curve, a dollar reduction
in revenue is associated with an increase in deadweight loss of 3.0.
Because profit-maximizing structural density is independent of the property tax rate,
the above results hold independent of the form of the structure production function. The
results, displayed in Table 1.2, indicate that the effects of the Canadian property tax are
14A somewhat mechanical explanation is provided in Appendix 1.2.
e)
b)
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substantial. With the chosen parameters, a two-percent tax rate, for example, causes land
value to fall to only IgTo of pre-tax value, generates a deadweight loss of 23% of pre'tax
value, and causes development of the land to be postponed 55 years!
If the tax is imposed at a location for which 16 is lower, with the exogenous functions
and other exogenous parameters held fixed, the only change is that everything occurs later.
If,forexample,ri:f,everythingoccursItn{+|:34.7vearslater(see(1.42)).? \'0,/
It bears repeating that the above results describe the effects of imposing the property
tax on a single parcel of land. The general equilibrium effects, which could be examined in
a growing, fully-closed monocentric city model, would be considerably more complicated.
L.3.2 Simple property tax system (r, 
- 
rK 
- 
rs : rs
We now consider a simple tax system in which the tax rates applied to pre-development
land value and post-development property value are the same. This is the tax system most
Americans would identifu as "the property tax".
As displayed in Figure 1.4, the simple property tax system causes both the timing and
density first-order conditions to shift to the right (see (1.39) and (1.40)) such that: i)
development density falls; and ii) development time may either be postponed or brought
forward, depending on parameter values and the form of the structure prod'rction function.
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Fock
Focf<
Figure I.4: The simple property tax system
From (1.43) and (1.39):
\ * r, Tle-r'T7?(0) _ r(r)ar)rt" (
From (1.38) and (1.39):
(i 
- 
q)(i,+ rs) (, + rs 
- 
ri(i, -1- rs)
qrg)Q6)
-€
- 
(i'+r')T
+ G)(? + r' 
- 
rl)
( 1.51)
And then.
v" (o)
from (1.47), (1.50)
( 1.52)
(i,
and (1.51):
D(0)
lqrT)Q(x) .-ir1Liu4e l
)
(rt + r,)rg)A6)
(i,+ ,')(i 
- 
rl) "-ir. ( 1.53)
Unfortunately, the results for this type of property tax system are not as neat as those
for the Canadian property tax system because the tax alters structural density, which
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complicates the algebra. We can, however, obtain some analytical results for the special
case of CES production functions. We assume that
Q(K) : co(1 + clKo)n ,
where o : + in the elasticity of substitution between land and capital in the structure
production function. Then from (1.a1):
(1.54)
and
( 1.55)
from which it follows that development is postponed or brought forward according to
whether r" (*) +1-j; ln ((9) (4ffi)) is greater or less than zero, or since r-o ) o
according to whether f" (*) is greater or less than oln (*#). And from (1.39) and
(1.54):
From (1.39):
r(r)aw)-(i'*r,)r(ffi) *
Inserting (1.57) into (1.51) 
- 
(1.53) yields
( 1.56)
( 1.57)
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and
R(o) 
-p( 't" )tt"-ir(q+"- T']"t)\ / '\i+rr-n/ \i-q 'i*rt-rl/
vo(o\- , TP , ( '1" ): 
"-(i,+r,)T\ '/ (i+rr-T) \i+rt-rl/
D(0)
( 1.58)
(1 5e)
( 1.60)
We shall now use these formulae in a numerical example. We employ the same parameters
as in the numerical example of the previous subsection, and choose cs and cl such that
K : Q : 1 in the absence of taxation. We shall consider three values for the elasticity
of substitution in the structure production function: o : .25,.5,.75. In the absence of
taxation the site is developed at t :50 and has Vb : 1. The results are displayed in Table
1.3.
With a low elasticity of substitution for the structure production function, the developer
responds to the tax by building somewhat later at slightly lower density. Compare Table
1.2 with Table 1.3A. The relative efficiency of the Canadian tax system and the simple tax
system with o : .25 can be gauged by comparing the deadweight losses for a given amount
of revenue collected, or vice versa. Recall that with a constant rate of rental growth, the
tax rates for a neutral property tax system are given in (1.15). It is not obvious which
of the Canadian or simple tax systems deviates more from the neutral tax system. But
for the parameter values of the numerical example, with o : .25 the simple tax system is
the more efficient. For intermediate values of the elasticity of substitution, the developer
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responds to the tax principally by building at moderately lower density, and for high values
by building considerably earlier at considerably lower density. The tax system becomes
more distortionary the higher the elasticity of substitution, and for o :.75 the Canadian
tax system is more efficient than the simple tax system. Based on empirical studies which
estimate the elasticity of substitution between land and capital in the structure production
function (reviewed in McDonald(1981)), the current wisdom is that o lies between .6 and
.7; and in this range the efficiency of the two tax systems is similar.
0.8
0.6
0.4
o-2
xc
Ts ,o=0.25
Ts , O=0.5
Ts , O:0.75
\
I
0.6 R(0)
Figure 1.5
Figure 1.5 plots 2(0) versus R(0) for the Canadian property tax system and the simple
property tax system with o 
- 
.25,.5, and .75. As noted above, the simple property tax
system is more efficient the lower the elasticity of substitution between land and capital in
the structure production function. F\rrthermore, the Canadian property tax system is less
efficient than the simple property tax system with o : .25 and o : .5 but more efficient
\
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Thble 1.3
Numerical example with simple property tax
T K a T v(o) 
- 
,c(o) R-(0) R,*(0) 7?(0) D(0) MDWL
0 1 1 50 1 0 0 0 0 0.00
.01 .794 .909 57.6 .r77 .138 .632 .770 .052 0.39
.02 .693 .843 65.7 .039 .105 .721 .826 .135
-3.4r
.03 .630 .794 73.r .009 .070 .709 .780 .2L2
-r.22
(o) o 
- 
.25, co 
- 
1 .I447L
.01 .500 .750 44.L .r92 .106 .597 .703 .105 1.30
.02 .300 .600 46.2 .050 .075 .624 .699 .252
- 
1.65
.03 .250 .500 50.0 .au .048 .563 .611 .375
- 
1.13
(b) 
":.50,e:1.5
.01 .125 .422 3.56 .243 .009 .503 .512 .245
-4.99
.02" .037 .28L 0 .101 0 .463 .463 .436
-2.07
.03* .016 .208 0 .051 0 .386 .386 .563 _T.47
(") o: .75, co 
- 
3.375
Parameter ualues'in all panel I :'i : .03, q 
- 
.02, p : 2.2408, ro : .02473I, cL : .5
Notes: 1. *The formulae presented in this subsection a,re for the case f > O. ff
f < O according to (1.56), development occurs today. The calculations are modified
accordingly. (F,q. (1.39) does not apply and 7 is set to 0. 1{ is then determined from
(1.40) alone, from which Q follows. 7"(0) is then determined from (1.38), D(0) from
(L.44), and 7?(0) as a residual per (1.37) from (1.43). 7?(0) : ffild,where
Q(K) :* (r + 
"ro*)# u,,d x* + "r: (ffi;)'-" ,.
2. R-(O) iscalculatedfrom (17a'), ana 7l'+(0) as7l'+(0) : R(0)-R-(0).
3. The revenue-maximizing tax rate and maximum revenue arei o 
- 
.25,
rs : -0776, 7l(0) : .8286; o : .5, T": .01-40, R(0) : .725; o 
- 
.75, r" : .00850,
R(0): .517.
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with o : .75. Since empirical evidence suggests that o lies in the range (.5,.75), for the
parameters of the example at least the Canadian and simple property tax systems are
comparable in efficiency.
1.3.3 Residual site value tax system (r* :0, Tv : rs 
= 
rr)
Residual site value taxation is employed in China (Wong(1999)) and in some Australian
states (Youngman and Malme (1993)). Residual site value taxation leaves unchanged the
position of the timing first-order condition and causes the density first-order condition to
shift down 
- 
as displayed in Figure 1.6. As a result, as the tax rate rises development
occurs earlier and at a lower densitv.
Fock
Focf(
Figure 1.6: Residual site value taxation
From (1.43) and (1.39):
R(0) 
- 
r(r) A6)"-ir ( r, ' =-/- \(, -q)i
Flom (1.38) and (1.3e):
Tle-r'T (1.61)
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(i,+ rr) (i * r, 
- 
ril
v"(0) (i+rr)(i*r,-n)
And from (r.47), (1.61), and (L.62):
(1.62)
(1.63)
(1.65)
(1.66)
(1.67)
. , __g_K:(, r" )*u'a e6):^(-1-\"*, (1.64)\i*r,-q) - \t*r,/
which are the same expressions as for the simple property tax, but with r" replacing r".
Flom (1.39):
As with the simple property tax system, we a,ssume that the structure production func-
tion is CES. Then from (1.41):
D(0)
lqrQ)Q(K) ,-i.r1 qrQ)Q6) o-ir
L i(t-ril v J i\-rt)
r_1
rl
and
Then:
Tle-r'T
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(i,+ rr) (i I r, 
- 
q)
v"(0) 
-
qxp(t+r,)(i*r,-rl) ( qr, )'= "-(i,+r,)r\z + r, - rl ) ( 1 .6s)
and
D(o):lffi#l,l _#(#_)ft "-0, (16e)
We now turn to the numerical example. The parameters are exactly the same as for
corresponding case for the simple property tax system example. The results are displayed
in Table 1.4.
Comparing this table with Table 1.3, it is evident, for the example considered at least,
that residual site value taxation is more efficient than simple property taxation. The only
difference between the two tax systems is that residual site value taxation exempts struc-
tures. The supplementary taxation of structures under the simple property tax system is
so distortionary that in a number of the cases treated 
- 
those with higher rates of taxation
and higher substitution elasticities 
- 
setting the tax rates equal, the revenue raised from
residual site value taxation is higher than under simple property taxation. Put alternatively,
holding the tax rate constant, revenue would be increased by exempting structures from
taxation.
L.3.4 Differentiated property tax system (rv : Ts 
= 
Tp t 0,16 unrestricted)
There is potentially a considerable variety of hybrid property tax systems. One is the neu-
tral property tax system discussed in Arnott (2000). Here we discuss the d,ifferenti,ated
property tax system, employed in Australia, New Zealand, and Pittsburgh, under which
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Table L.4
Numerical example with residual site value taxation.
T K a T v(o) 
- 
4(o) R-(0) R*(0) R(0) D(0) MDWL
0 1 1 50 1 0 0 0 0 0.00
.01 .794 .909 43.2 .237 .L28 .608 .736 .028 0.L7
.02 .693 .843 40.2 .0833 .103 .744 .847 .070 1.13
"03 .630 .794 38.4 .0351 .076 .780 .856 .109 -4.14(") o 
- 
.25
.01 .500 750 29.7 .256 .089 .574 .663 .081 0.75
.02 .300 .600 20.6 .107 .054 .644 .698 .195 *3.77
.03 .250 .500 15.3 .0588 .033 .619 .651 .293
- 
1.56
(b) o 
-.5
.01* .r72 .492 0 .320 .000 .5L2 .5L2 .168 0.42
.02* .r32 .433 0 .180 .000 .596 .596 .276 r.27
.03* .L12 .399 0 .12L .000 .615 .615 .265 3.64
(r) o 
- 
.75
Notes: *1. The formulae presented in this subsection are for the case f > O. tf
f < O according to (1.65), development occurs today. The calculations a.re modified
accordingly.
2. The revenue-maximizing tax rate and maximum revenue axei o 
- 
.25,
rr:.0267, 7?.(0): .8574; o:.5,Tr:.0167, 7l(0): .7035; o 
- 
-75,rr:.04L5,
/t(0) : .619.
pre-development land value and post-development residual site value are taxed at the same
positive rate, and structure value at a different rate, where r1, is the tax rate on "land
value". The standard rationale for this type of system goes as follows: Site value taxation
is non-distortionary but does not raise sufficient revenue to finance the level of public ser-
vices demanded in a modern economy, and so is supplemented with distortionary structure
value taxation but at a lower tax rate. Since these jurisdictions measure post-development
site value as residual site value, and since residual site value taxation is distortionary, the
standard rationale is flawed.15 It is nonetheless of interest to enquire: Within this class of
lsThere is a more basic logical flaw in the standard rationale for a differentiated property tax system. A
pure land value tax (tax on market land value prior to development and on raw site value afber development),
set at an infinite rate, extracts a site's entire discounted surplus. No antici,pated, property tax system can
raise more than this amount. To do so would require a negative landowner discounted surplus, which is not
35
property tax systems, what ratio of ff is the most efficient and what does this ratio depend
on?
The analysis is complicated by the presence of two regimes: i > O and f < 0. The
way we shall proceed is to: first, examine the systems of equations that applies with f > 0
without reference to the constraint that this system of equations applies when and only
when i > 0; second, examine the systems of equations that applies with i < 0 (and hence
T : 0) without reference to the constraint that this system of equations applies when and
only when f < O; and finally put the pieces together.
L.3.4.L i>o
Ftom (1.41), application of this differentiated property tax system results in construction
at lower than the efficient density. And since this tax system has the simple property tax
system and residual site value tax systems as special cases, it is clear from previous results
that its application may cause development to be either postponed or brought forward. We
continue to assume that structure production exhibits constant elasticity of substitution.
Thus, from (1.41):
K-(, q" )'=\i + rL - q )
And then from (1.39):
A6) - c4 ( rt \il;t., I\r1-rL/ (1.70)
( 1.71)
possible with anticipation. Consider the effects of broadening the tax base to include structures. At low tax
rates, the addition of structures to the tax base does result in higher revenue. But above a certain tax rate,
the revenue generated from structures is more than offset by the decline in revenue generated from the land
deriving from the distortion caused by the taxation of structures.
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From (1.43) and (1.39):
and
e-rrT e + ,rc)rt
(i + ,r) (, + rL 
- 
rl) (1.72)
( 1.73)
Define the fficiency locus to be the locus of (rx,rr,) that raise a given amount of
revenue with minimum deadweight loss. Analytical characterization of the efficiency locus
is algebraically messy.l6 Consequently, we examine diagrammatically the efficiency locus
for the three examples considered in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.
Figure 1.7A displays iso-revenue contours, iso-deadweight-loss contours, and the cor-
responding efficiency locus for o : .25. For all levels of revenue indicated, q > ry. The
revenue-maximizing tax rates are rK : .0039 and r7 : .0251, and the maximum revenue is
.862.
The simple property tax system is the same as the differentiated property system with
the constraint imposed that ry : rt. Thus, comparison of the difierentiated and simple
property tax systems indicates the gains that can be achieved by taxing post-development
residual site value and structure value at different rates. With the corresponding simple
property tax system (from Table 1.3), the revenue-maximizing tax rate is .0176 and the
maximum revenue .829. Plotting 2 (0) against R (0) for the differentiated property tax
system and comparing the locus with the corresponding locus in Figure 1.5 for the simple
16It can however be shown that structure value should be taxed not subsidized 
- 
see Appendix 1.3.
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property tax system would indicate the proportional efficiency
revenue levels from employing differentiated rather than simple
gain achievable at different
property taxation.
BIK
Figure 1.7A: Efficient land/site and
structure value tax rates: o=.25
Notes: What is labelled the "efficiency locus" is in fact the locus of
tangency points of iso-revenue and iso-deadweight loss
contours. The relevant portion of this locus runs from the
origin to the maximum revenue point.
The residual site value tax system is the same as the differentiated property tax system,
with the constraint imposed that ry : 0. Thus, comparison of the differentiated and residual
site value tax systems indicates the gain that can be achieved over residual site value
taxation by taxing structure value. The maximum revenue that can be achieved under
residual site value taxation is .857. Thus, for this example, the extra revenue that can be
generated under the differentiated property tax system from being able to tax structure
value in addition to land value is quite modest.
Iso-Rev Curves
Iso-DWL Cunres
Efficiency Locus
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Iso*.ev Curves
IsoDWL Curves
Efficiency Locus
TK
Figure 1.7B: Efficient land and structure
value tax rates: o:.5
Notes: What is labelled the "efficiency locus" is in fact the locus of
tangency points of iso-revenue and iso-deadweight loss
contours. The relevant portion of this locus runs from the
origin to the maximum revenue point.
Figure 1.7B is the same as Figure 1.7A but is for o : .5 (and the corresponding param-
eters from Table 1.3). The revenue-maximizing tax rates are rK : .0099 and rp: .0150,
and the maximum revenue is .728. Observe that ff is higher at the revenue maximum with
o : .5 than with o : .25. For o : .5, the revenuq-maximizing tax rate under the simple
property tax system is .0140 and the maximum revenue is .725. The improvement in effi-
ciency from being able to tax post-development site value and structure value at different
rates is small. Under the residual site value tax system, the revenue-maximizing tax rate is
.0167 and the maximum revenue is .703.
Figure 1.7C is the same as Figures 1.7A and 1.7B but is for o : .75. The revenue-
maximizing tax rates are rK : .0072 and rp 
- 
.0229, and the maximum revenue is .540.
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Under the simple property tax system, the revenue-maximizing tax rate is .0122 and the
maximum revenue is .499 , while under the residual site value tax system the corresponding
figures are .008 and .460.
These examples illustrate that, for ? > 0, residual site value taxation is more efficient
than simple property taxation for low levels of o, and less efficient for higher levels, which
is explained below. In all cases, the relative efficiency gains achieved from employing dif-
ferentiated property taxation (with 16 and q set at optimal levels) rather than simple
or residual site value taxation appear quite modest; the robustness of the result is worth
examining. Finally, for the simple, residual, and differentiated property tax systems, the
deadweight loss due to property taxation appears to be more sensitive to the elasticity of
substitution between land and structures in the structure production function than to the
form of property taxation employed, which points to the importance of obtaining more
accurate estimates of this elasticity.
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Figure 1.7C: Efficient land and structure
value tax rates: o=.75
Notes: What is labelled the "efficiency locus" is in fact the locus of
tangency points of iso-revenue and iso-deadweight loss
contours. The relevant portion of this locus runs from the
origin to the maximum revenue point.
A differentiated Canadian property tax system under which 'rv : O and rs ) rx
is possible. Indeed, the neutral property tax system identified in (1.15) is an example,
under which full surplus extraction with no deadweight loss is achievable. Recall that the
maximum revenue with an undifferentiated Canadian property tax system (from Table 1.2,
with z : .02) is .577. Thus, for the Canadian property tax system differentiation of the
post-development tax rates generates significant efficiency gains.
L.3.4.2 T <0
In this case, T is set to 0. K is then determined from (1.40) alone, from which Q follows.
Vo(0) is then determined from (1.38), D(0) from (1.44) and 7l(0) as a residual per (1.37)
0
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from (1.43). Since there are now two tax rates and only the capital first-order condition,
in the light of the argument presented in Arnott(2002), it should not be surprising that by
setting rx : ffi\, condit'ional on T: 0 revenue can be raised without distortion, with
the amount rising with 11, until with 21, : m full surplus extraction is achieved.
1.3.4.3 Putting the pieces together
T\rrn to Fig. 7A, which applies to the case i > 0. This case applies when (16,21,) are such
that 7 in (1.71) is greater than or equal to zero. Since T in (1.71) is increasing in 16 and
decreasing in r1,, and since ? : 50 with (rx,rt): (0,0), f : 0 is a positively-sloped locus
lying above the origin. Below the locus, the equations for f > 0 apply, and above the locus
those for f < O apply. Below the f : 0 locus, the efficiency locus is positively-sloped;
above the locus, it is given by ry : ffi Thus there is a discontinuity in the efficiency
locus as it crosses the f : 0 locus; below the f : O locus, the efficiency locus takes into
account that a rise in tax revenue affects two margins, timing and density, while above the
i:0 locus, the efficiency locus takes into account that there is only the density margin.
Now consider determination of the revenue.maximizing tax rate. There are two local
revenue maxima. The first is at (z6, rr) : (-q,oo); here, timing is distorted with T : 0
instead of. T :50, but density is efficient conditional on timing. The second is the revenue-
maximizing (rx,rr) below or on the i : }locus. If it is on the locus, it is dominated
by (rx,rr) : (-\,oo) since that pair of tax rates is efficient conditional on T :0. If it is
below the locus, there are two local maxima which must be compared; the former entails
distortion on only the timing margin, the latter less distortion on the timing margin but
more on the density margin.
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The numerical results are displayed in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5
Ir{umerical example with differentiated property value taxation.
Revenue-maximizing tax rates.
Localmarimunl, 1T <0 Local marimunl 2T > 0
o TL rK 7?(0) K a TL rK R(0) K a T
.25 oo
-.02 .554 .593 .76L .025L .0039 .862* .658 .817 45.39
.50 oo
-.02 .753* .4L0 .676 .0150 .0099 .728 .399 .666 38.69
.75 oo
-.02 .892* .298 .632 .0092 .0229 .540 .188 .513 28.04
Notes: 1. Pa.rameter values are the same as for the corresponding case of o in Tables
1.3 and 1.4.
2. * indicates the global-maximizing set of tax rates and revenue.
A pattern is evident. For f > 0, as the elasticity of substitution increases, the maxi-
mum surplus extraction and ft at the revenue maximum fall. To understand these results,
consider first the extreme case of o : O. Density is unaffected by taxation, and efficient
timing can be maintained by setting rK :0 (see (1.71)), with full surplus extraction being
achieved by setting TL : @.In this extreme case, therefore, residual site value taxation is
non-distortionary, while simple property taxation is distortionary. As the elasticity of sub-
stitution increases, both timing and density, and hence deadweight loss, become relatively
more sensitiveto ry than to qa (see (1.70), (1.71) and (1.73)) implying that simple prop
erty taxation increases in efficiency relative to residual site value tax system. For i < 0
and 7 : 0, in contrast, as the elasticity of substitution increases the maximum surplus
extraction rises and the revenue-maximizing tax rates remain unchanged. To understand
the former result, consider first the limiting case as a approaches 1. The timing and density
first-order conditions then almost co'i,ncide, implying that almost the same surplus can be
achieved at T :0 and an appropriately reduced density as at the no-tax optimum, and the
appropriately reduced density is achieved with full surplus extraction with 16 : 
-0.02 and
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TL : 6. At the other extreme with o : O, construction occurs at the same density as at
the no-tax optimum but fifty years earlier, which entails considerable distortion.
L.4 Concluding Comments
This paper examined the deadweight loss due to the property tax when the property tax
is realistically modeled as a tax on value rather than as a tax on rent. The analysis was
partial equilibrium, examining the effects of the property tax when it is applied to a single,
small parcel of land, and paying no attention to the disposition of the tax revenue raised.
To keep the algebra manageable, a number of simplifying assumptions were made. Most
notably, the extreme case of infinitely durable structures was considered. The landowner
decides when to build a structure on his vacant land and at what density, and subsequently
that structure remains on the site forever with no depreciation. Thus, the deadweight loss
due to the property tax derives from its changing the timing and density of construction.
The property tax was modeled as a triple of time-invariant tax rates, the first applied to
pre-development land value, the second to post-development (residual) site value (defined
as property value minus construction costs), and the third to structure value (measured
by construction costs). A number of variants of the property tax were examined: i) the
"Canadian" property tax system r:nder which property value is taxed after development,
with pre-development land value exempt from taxation; ii) the simple property tax system
under which pre-development land value and post-development property value are taxed
at the same rate; iii) the residual site value tax system under which pre.development land
value and post-development residual site value are taxed at the same rate, with structure
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value exempt; and iv) the differentiated property tax system, which is like the residua,l site
value tax system except that structure value is taxed but at a different rate. The paper
focused on the special case where the rate of rental growth is constant.
All four tax systems are distortionary (Arnott (2002) derives the property tax system
that is neutral in the context of the model). The Canadian property tax system causes
later development at unchanged density; the simple and differentiated property tax systems
have an ambiguous effect on development time but unambiguously discourage density; and
the residual site value tax system results in earlier development at lower density. For the
Canadian property tax system, the revenue-maximizing tax rate equals the growth rate of
rents and the marginal deadweight loss equals the tax rate divided by the growth rate of
rents less the tax rate. The corresponding results for the other property tax systems are not
as neat, depending inter al'i,a on the current level of rents and the elasticity of substitution
between land and capital in the structure production function. For each of the property
tax systems considered, for a set of plausible parameter values we computed deadweight
loss as a function of the tax rate. Two results were particularly striking. First, in all the
numerical examples, the revenue-maximizing tax rate was lower than the actual effective
property tax rate employed in many jurisdictions, suggesting that some jurisdictions may
be tton the wrong sid.e of the Laffer curve" with respect to property taxation. Second, in aii
the examples except for the Canadian property tax system, deadweight loss was strongly
positively related to the elasticity of substitution between land and capital in the production
of structures, and the revenue-maximizing tax rate strongly negatively related to it, which
points to the importance for policy analysis of precise estimation of this elasticity.
In the course of our analysis, we encountered a general conceptual issue of how to
45
compare the efficiency of two inter-temporal tax systems. Though doing so entails time
inconsistency, we compared their efficiency from today forward.
In the paper, we provided a reasonably thorough analysis of the efficiency effects of a
variety of idealized property tax systems, but in the context of a specific, partial equilibrium
model. It remains to be seen how robust our results are. There are several important issues
for future resea,rch:
1. We modeled the property tax as applying to a single, atomistic property. How should
the model be generalized to a metropolitan area or to an entire country, and how will this
generalization affect the results?17' 18
2. We assumed that structures are completely immalleable. Does introducing deprecia-
tion and property rehabilitation and redevelopment significantly alter the results?
17An appealing way to address this question would be to analyze the effects of alternative property value
tax systems in the context of a model of growing, monocentric city with completely durable housing model
in which developers have perfect foresight (Fujita (1976), Arnott (1980), and Wheaton (1982)). Our analysis
generalizes straightforwardly to an open city since equilibrium housing rents are then una,ffected by prope-rb,y
taxation. In a closed cit5r, however, housing rents axe a,ffected by property taxation, which considerably
complicates the a.nalysis.
In a growing monocentric city with completely durable housing different locations have different devel-
opment times, which complicates the comparison of property tax systems to be implemented today. For
properties that have already been developed, the (unanticipated) imposition of a property tax from today
forward entails no distortion; for properties that will be developed far off into the future, the bulk of the
present value of revenue collected from the tax will be collected prior to development. Thus, a tax system
that is relatively efficient at some locations may be relatively inefficient at others, and the overall efficiency
of a tax system entails averaging over locations.
l8Think of the standard partial equilibrium tax analysis. The deadweight loss for a given tax rate or a
given amount of tax revenue is higher, the larger are the demand and supply elasticities. Looking at a single
property for which rent is fixed is analogous to assuming a perfectly elastic demand curve. Thus, it is natural
to conjecture that the deadweight loss from a given property tax system, whether for a particula.r property
tax rale or for a given amounf of tax revenue collected, is lower the less elastic is demand. Accordingly,
looking at a single property with exogenous rent tends to ov,rrstate the deadweight loss due to property
taxation.
This intuition can be formalized by considering a growing closed (exogenous population) monocentric
city in which demand is such that housing unit size is fixed and the elasticity of substitution between land
and capital in the production of the floor a,rea is zero. At a given point in time, housing unit size, the
floor-a.rea ratio of housing, and population are all independent of the property tax system in place; so too
therefore is the residential area of the city and the boundary of urban development. In this special case,
therefore, all property tax systems have no efect on the density and timing of development, and hence
generate no deadweight loss. If the elasticity of substitution in housing production is non-zero, however,
property taxation generates deadweight loss by inducing inefficient factor proportions-structural density.
This line of reasoning leads to the conjecture that the deadweight loss due to a property tax system
is higher the greater the elasticity of demand for housing and the greater is the elasticity of substitution
between capital and land in the production of housing. The difficulty in formalizing the conjecture is in
deciding what to hold fixed while these elasticities are being varied.
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3. We made a number of simplifying assumptions: no technical change, a constant
interest rate, no change in construction costs, zero pre.development land rent, and a con-
stant growth rate of floor rent. How does relaxing these assumptions affect our results
qualitatively and quantitatively?
4. Our analysis ignored uncertainty, which is surely important in property development.
Since Capozza and Li (1994) introduced stochasticity into the Arnott-Lewis model, one
obvious approach is to extend their analysis to treat a variety of property value tax systems.
5. We assumed that the developer has complete discretion concerning when and at
what density to build. But in practice his choice is constrained by a variety of development
controls and zoning regulations.lg If they are so strict that they result in the same devel-
opment time and density with and without a particular property tax system, the property
tax system is neutral.
6. In an earlier version of the paper, we contrasted our analysis of the property tax as a
tax on value with the conventional analysis which treats the property tax as a tax on rent,
especially with respect to measurement of deadweight loss. This topic merits consideration.
7. It is shown in Arnott (2002) that a tax on "net site rent" (equal to zero prior to
development ard r(t)Q(K) 
- 
LpX afber development) is neutral. Net site rent taxation
is pir:esumably not employed because net site rent is unobservable or ot'servable only at
prohibitive cost. Our analysis treated observability only implicitly. Perhaps a more explicit
treatment would be fruitful.
In the introduction, we emphasized that the choice of property tax system entails a
tradeoff between conventional deadweight loss and administrative costs broadly speaking.
leln analyzing the efEciency of alternative property tax systems with development controls and zoning
regulations, it is important to recognize that they a,re imposed to deal with perceived ma,rket failure.
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At one extreme is a
costly to administer.
more difficult will be
classical land value tax system, which is non-distortionary but very
Our paper focused on quantifying deadweight loss. As important but
to quantify the other side of the tradeoff.
48
Bibliography
[1] Arnott, R. (1980) "A Simple Urban Growth Model with Durable Housing", Regi,onal
Science and Urban Economics, Vol.10, pp. 53-76.
[2] Arnott, R. (2002) "Neutral Property Taxation" http://FMWWW.bc.edu/EC-
V/Arnott.fac.html
[3] Arnott, R.J., and F.D. Lewis (1979) "The Transition of Land to Urban Use" Journal
of Poli,tical Economy, Vol. 87, pp. 161-169.
[4] Bentick, B.L. (1979) "The Impact of Taxation and Valuation Practices on Timing and
Efficiency of Land Use" Journal of Politi,cal Economy, Vol.87, pp. 858-868.
l5l Capozza, D., and Y. Li (1994) "The Intensity and Timing of Investment: The Case of
Land" American Econom'i,c Rea'i,ew, Vol. 84, pp. 889-904.
[6] Cannan, E. (1959) "Minutes of Royal Commission on Local Taxation, 1899" reprinted
in Readings in the Economics of Taxation, R. Musgrave and C. Shoup, eds. (Home-
wood, IL:R.Irwin) , I7L-20L.
[7] Fisher, S. and A.H. Peters (1998) Industri,al Incentiaes: Compet'it'ion em,ong American
States and Cities (Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn).
[8] Fujita, M. (1976) "Spatial Patterns of Urban Growth: Optimum and Market" Journal
of Urban Econom'ics, Vol. 3, pp.209-24L.
[9] Hamilton, B.W. (1975) "Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Govern-
ments" Urban Studies, Vol. 12, pp.205-27I.
49
[10] Ladd, H.F. (1997) "Theoretical Controversies: Land and Property Taxation" Local
Gouemment Tae and, Land Use Polici,es in the United States: Und,erstandi,ng the L'inks,
Ch.2 (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar).
[11] Marshall, A. Princi,ples o! Economics, gth ed., 1961, Appendix G (1961:MacMillan).
[12] McDonald, J. (1981) "Capital-Land Substitution in Urban Housing: A Survey of Em-
pirical Estimates" Journal of Urban Eennomics, Vol.9, pp.190-221.
[13] Mieszkowski, P. (L972) "The Property Tax An Excise Tax or a Profit Tax ?" Journal
of Public Econom'i,cs, Vol.1, pp. 73-96.
[14] Mills, D.E. (1981) "The Non-neutrality of Land Value Taxation" National Tar Joumal,
VoI.34, pp. 125-129.
[15] Mills, E.S. (1998) "Is Land Taxation Practical?" ilIi,nois ReaI Estate Letter, Fall, pp.
1- 5.
[16] Netzer, D. (1966) Econom'i,cs of the Property Tar (The Brookings Institution).
[17] Netzer, D., Ed.(1998) Land Value Taration: Can It and, Will It Work Today? (Cam-
bridge, MA: Lincoln Institute).
[18] Shoup, D. (1970) "The Optimal Timing of Urban Land Development" Papers ol the
Reg'ional Science Association, Vol. 25, pp. 33-44.
[19] Skouras,A. (1978) "The Non-neutrality of Land Taxation" Publi,c Finance, Vol.30,
pp.113-134.
[20] Tideman, N.T. (1982) "A Tax on Land Is Neutral" National Tar Jour"nal, Vol.35, pp.
109-111.
[21] Tideman, N. (undated) "Taxing Land is Better than Neutral: Land Taxes, Land Spec-
ulation and the Timing of Development" mimeo.
[22] Vickrey, W.S. (1970) "Defining Land Value for Taxation Purposes", in The Assessment
of Land, Value by D.M. Holland, ed. (Milwaukee, WI: University of Wisconsin Press).
50
[23] Wheaton, W. C. (1982) "Urban Residential Growth under Perfect Foresight" Journal
of Urban Economics. Vol. 12, p 7-27.
[24] Wong, K.C. (1999) "The Evolution of Land Value Taxation in China" Constract'ion
and, Real Estate Reuiew, Vol.3, pp. 1-4.
[25] Youngman, J.M. and J.H. Malme (1993) An Internat'ional Surveg of To,res on Land
and Buildi,ngs (Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer).
51
Appendix 1.1-: Relative Efficiency of the Canadian and Simple
Property Tax Systems (Not for publication)
We start by recording the formulae for revenue raised from the Canadian property tax
system (Eq. 1.48), and the deadweight loss (Eq. 1.50):
. / ir. \/ i-rt \;
,z(o) :v'(o)(.ffi)\;;=l
D(0) : vb1o1 ( t 
- 
(qi - rf +:r,-)) (, u - n,-)i
't 
'-'\- \ 
"/(z-ri) ))\i,*r"-q)
To obtain the corresponding formulae for the simple tax system will require some addi-
tional algebra. Rewrite (1.51) and (1.53), using (1.47):
??(o) :,,r\fffiffi (T: - dffiH (A1 1 1)
D(0): vo@(t-i(rg)Q6)e-ff)"tf+)) (A1.1.2)"/ 
'"' \^ q (r(T)Q6)e-t'r1o \t + r" ) ) \' --
Flom (1.55) and (1.56):
Qr@A6)e:':):: f-+-) * 
"-{o-r)t "-ro) (A1.1.3)U(r)Q(K)e-ir)o \i * r" /
with
To- Tb: !(rn(o*""\* o h((i+,'"\(, o-n )))tl\ \ t / L-o \\ i /\i*rs-q///
: i-d('"(it) *oh(ffi)) tAl 14)
so that
"-(i-n)(r"-r'):(;i)* e#ffi (A1.1.b)
Substituting (A1.1.5) into (A1.1.3) yields
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("(r) A6)"-u')"
?Q)AW)"-u')o
And substituting (A1.1.6) and (1.56)
noii-r1 o(i-,I)( , \ *=t (t,+ r, - rt\ tG6\r+r,) \ i-ry /
into (A1.1.1) and (A1 .1.2) yields
(A1.1.6)
(A1 .1.7)
,.(o) : ,'ror(#a)- (*r?a')ffi
,(r*""-( ,,0.-, \/'o'o \7(u*ri" \)*)t 'i - \Ac + r":t 1 yr6Td ) \"' 1, + "",r/ /(A1.1.8)
The relative efficiency of the two tax systems for a given set of parameter values can
be calculated as follows. Set r" and from (A1.1.7) and (A1.1.8) calculate the corresponding
deadweight loss and tax revenue. From (1.48) calculate the r" which raises the same amount
of tax revenue and from (1.50) calculate the corresponding deadweight loss. Then compare
the deadweight losses.
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Appendix L.2: Some Isomorphisms (For
Some insights can be gained by viewing our model as a static model, with prices and
quantities in present value terms. One unit ofstructure constructed today generates present
discounted revenue of ff r(t)e-itdt - g : p. Interpret this as the exogenous consumer
price of structure. Accordingly, the quantity of structure produced on a unit of area of land
- 
in present value terms 
- 
is Q(K)e-Q-'t)T , and the quantity of capital employed 
- 
in
present value terms 
- 
is Ke-ff. Defining D 
=e-ir, the developerts net revenue or profit
function in the absence of taxation is
II(K.,D) 
-/Q(K)D+ - pKD. (A1 .2.r)
The corresponding first-order conditions for profit-maximization are
publication)
which have straightforward interpretations.
With taxatioo, from (1.38) the developer's profit function is
n(K,D) _pe@)Dry ( , n 
_, ,\ -+pKDtY\, + rs - rl ) i + rs-
The isomorphisms arise when rv 
- 
O. For this special case,
D : pe6)(ry)r-+ 
-pK-o'\ i / '
K : pQ'6)D#-pD-O,
(A1 .2.2)
(A1 .2.3)
(A1 .2.4)
(A1 .2.5)
Comparing (A1.2.1) and (A1.2.5), we obtain the following isomorphisms.
1. A property tax system with ry : 0 and ry : ffi\ is isomorphic to a profit tax at
rate zq : if_n. This is the neutral tax system identified in Arnott (2002).
2. A property tax system with zy : 0 and Ts : 0 is isomorphic to a tax on the input
KD at rate 11 : !4.
3. A property tax system with ry : 0 and TK : Ts 
- 
a Canadian property tax system
- 
is isomorphic to an ad" ualorem taxon the output ]W)OT at rate ,6 : ffi.Tihe ad'
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aelorenx tax drives a wedge between the producer and consumer price. Since the consumer
price is exogenous (and the demand function therefore perfectly elastic) p(l * 16) : p,
where p is the producer price. From (A1.2 .5), p : P (ffi). Combining these two
formulae establishes the result.
This result allows us to provide an explanation, albeit a rather mechanical one, for the
results presented in Prop. 1.3.2. Define s: Q(K)D?. Then the tax revenue from the
Canadian property tax system may be written as
R(o) 
- 
re pq(p) 
- 
(P 
- 
p)q(p),
where q(p) is the supply curve. Maximizing R(0)
the tax-revenue-maximizing producer price:
(using p(I + to) : p) . (A1 .2.6)
with respect to p gives an expression for
p: 
-q(p) + (B - dq'b) - 0 =+
All that remains is to solve the elasticity of supply:
(A1 .2.7)
dq
dp
P- p 1
,g)
P €5
From (1.41) and (1.a5):
dK
d"" - 0
Recallins that p 
-e (ffi) ,rc: rst
dTl
dk
and D-e-iT gives
dK dr"
dr" dp
(A1 .2.r0)
n ,dD
- 
ff and, 
,dp
(A1.2.8)
(A1 .2.s)
(A1 .2.r0)
(A1 .2.rr)
dK
dp
Combining (4'1.2.8) and
dD dT dr" iD
dT dr" dp rlp
from which it follows that
yields
pdq i,-r7
(-Dt) qap rl
the revenue-maximizing tax rates are
and Tc: Tl.
DC
rl
TQ- 
-
?,-rl (A1 .2.12)
Thus, the revenue-maximizing tax rate under the Canadian property tax system equals the
growth rate of rents because:
i) the Canadian property tax system with an exogenous time path of rents is isomorphic
to an output tax in a static model with perfectly elastic demand;
ii) the revenue-maximizing tax rate for an output tax in a static model with perfectly
elastic demand equals the inverse of the elasticity of supply;
iii) the elasticity of supply in the static model isomorphic to the dynamic model of the
Canadian property tax system is ff; and
iv) an output tax rate 
"t T in the static model maps into a Canadian property tax
rate of 4.
Unfortunately, the pre-development land tax rate enters the developer's profit function,
(A7.2.4), in a way that does not correspond to the way in which linear input, output or
profit taxes enter the profit function in static models. As a result, there seems to be no
simple isomorphisms when Tv + O.
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Appendix 1.3: With an Efficient Differentiated Property Tax
System, when i > 0, rx ) 0 (Not for publication)
We prove this by showing that for 16 e (-i,Ol, W < 0 while H , O
. 
d?(o)l < 0a'x lrx c (-i,o] -
ftom (1.73):
W : - (#), (#-): (#* - n#),*
From (1.71):
(A1.3.1)
(A1 .3.2)
(A1 .3.4)
dT
dlk,
Combining (A1.3.1) and (A1.3.2) yields
1
q(i,+ ,rc)
qg: (q+"'\-( ,t"!-\#(, -(t:'t),"\ 
,)u-,rdrx -\,t-, 1n\1*,r-r) \f,,*,"n\x+rK)/( ,t"r 1f; rK:'\r.;-r) 
rGrd' (A1'3'3)
so that 491 < o.urK lrK e (-i,0] -
tR(o\ |
' ffi l"'. (-l,ol ) o
From (1.72)
d.lc(o)
drx eIt+rt-rt ) e
l- (t 
- 
'te-"Lr \ I| \,t-rt (i.*rr)Q*rr-rt) ) |xl-z#(w-ffi)l
| , _ dT e-rLr (1,+rx)rt IL -r-tLwM I
Substituting in (A1 .3.2) gives
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dR(o)
drx
(A1.3.5)
from a level in (-i,0]
is not well-defined for
so that
rylql rodrx lrn ,(-i,ol
Thus tiuttittg at (rx, rL) (with 17
to 3+ increases revenue and decreases deadweight loss. The model
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Chapter 2
The Annuity Puzzle Gets Bigger
2.L Introductron
Very little is known about why so few people buy annuities or why the standard economic
models do such a poor job of predicting who purchases annuities. My paper focuses on these
puzzles. I ask the following questions: Who buys annuities? Do they follow the predictions
of the standard model? And is there anything outside the standard economic theory that
will explain annuitization decisions?
Annuitization is becoming increasingly important in light of recent trends. First, there is
a growing tendency towards defined contribution (DC) pension plans, which create choices
that did not exist before. In most of the cases, people have to choose what form to receive
their pension benefits in: a lump sum or a monthly pension (annuity).l This trend may
coutinue, since many of the proposals for Social Security reform suggest introducing indi-
vidual retirement accounts, i.e. the Social Security benefits may no longer be in a form of
mandatory annuity. Whether a potential reduction in the annuitized benefit stream from
lDefined Contribution plans in United States are 401(k)s, 403(b)s, TSP (Thrift Savings Plan) for federal
government workers, and TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement
Equities F\rnd) for education and research workers.
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Social Security will lead to increased private demand for annuities is still an open issue
(Poterba (1997)). And, last but not least, people are living longer, plus the stock market
is in disarray. Many have started to worry that they will outlive their savings. However,
there is a solution that is called a life annuity: a financial vehicle that provides periodic
benefits for the lifetime of the participants.
Under the assumption of actuarially fair annuities, a life-cycle consumer without bequest
motives will always choose to annuitize all of his or her wealth (Yaari (1965)). The message
to annuitize comes both from economists and practitioners. According to Michael Lane, the
director of advisory services for TIAA-CREF, even partial annuitization is more beneficial
than no annuitization at all: a retirement portfolio divided between an annuity and a
managed portfolio could improve retirement security, providing more certain and larger
payouts than a fully managed portfolio.2 This strategy works best for retirees with assets
of $2 million or less. People with assets greater than $2 million generally do not need to
insure a minimum income stream.
The theoretical rationale for buying annuities only receives limited support from the
data. Out of 4.6 million retirees with positive net worth and no bequest motives, only 1.7
million have income from annuities.3 Assuming that the individuals optimize and do not
make systematic mistakes, we calnot explain why there are 2.9 million missing annuitants.
The innovation of my paper is that I use information from the Health and Retirement
Survey (HRS) to expand the standard economic model by linking psychology and eco
nomics. I look at people who are at the verge of retirement, have DC pension plans, and
2Michael Lane was cited in Kiplinger's Retirement Planning, Fall 2002, page 68.
3Author's calculations using HRS.
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are making decisions whether to annuitize the accumulated balances in their pension plans
or take a lump sum upon retirement. It is important to highlight that I am interested in
finding out who seeks annuity protection in addition to the one provided by Social Security
and defined benefit (DB) pension if any. I augment the standard approach to annuities
with additional considerations. Recently economists are getting more sophisticated about
preferences. There is evidence that people differ in their rates of time preference i.e. people
are not equally patient.a I test whether growing up in a rich family makes a person more
patient and more likely to annuitize. I find the opposite.
Who chooses an annuity over a lump sum? I find that people who believe they will live
longer than the average lifespan are more likely to choose annuities. I offer two explanations:
overconfidence and private information. I develop a measure of overconfidence and find that
it has no explanatory power. Therefore, I conclude that people who have private information
are those who decide to annuitize.
This paper consists of seven sections. Section 2.2 offers a literature review. Section 2.3
discusses the most common method used to value annuities-annuity equivalent wealth.
Section 2.4 augments the standard approach by introducing considerations of psychology,
human frailties, and the like. Section 2.5 presents the overconfidence concept and applies
it to the demand for annuities. Section 2.6 presents the r:ata and estimation, and the last
section concludes.
nsee for example Becker and Mulligan (1997) and Ravin (1999).
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2.2 Literature Review
Yaari (1965) develops the basic annuity model, which incorporates the uncertainty of one's
lifetime and solves the wealth allocation problem of an individual who optimizes the utility of
consumption over the life-cycle. Annuities are assumed to be actuarially fair.s Under these
conditions a life-cycle consumer without bequest motives will always choose to annuitize
100 percent. The intuition is that annuities always pay a higher rate of return than the
riskless asset, because there is some positive probability that the person will not be alive
to receive future payments. The insurance company is pooling the mortality risk of longer
and shorter-lived people. Then the portion of the principal associated with annuitants who
die "early" is redistributed within the fund to annuitants who survive to older age.
However, a risky asset is an alternative to the risk free investment and in practice the
rate of return of annuities is lower than other investment vehicles.6 But on the other hand,
annuities are the only instrument that provides life-time income guarantee. Friedman and
Warshawsky (1990) explore whether the yield differential is large enough to discourage a
risk-averse single individual from buying annuities in the absence of a bequest motive. Using
numerical simulations of the life-cycle model they find that the observed cost of annuities
can independently account for the absence of purchases of individual life annuities during
the early years of retirement, while at older ages the combination of the observed cost of
annuities and a bequest motive of plausible magnitude can account for this phenomenon.
Since buying an annuity causes loss of liquidity and prevents bequests, why not invest
sActuarial fairness is defined in the literature as equality of the premium cost and the expected present
discount value of annuity payouts. This definition ignores the administrative expenses that are incurred by
the insurance companies, and therefore the annuity payouts a,re likely to be overstated.
6For example Fliedman and Warshawsky (1990) reported that between 1968 and 1983, the average yield
of life annuities among the ten la.rgest insurers in the U.S. were lower than those of the 20-year government
bonds.
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upon retirement in equity, bonds, real estate etc. and withdraw periodically a fixed amount
or in other words self-annuitize? Milevsky (1998) provides an answer to this question by
developing a model in which retirees defer annuitization, via a "do-it-yourselftt scheme, until
it is no longer possible to beat the mortality-adjusted rate of return from an annuity. The
finding is that a sixty-five year old female (male) has a 90 percent (85 percent) chance of
beating the rate of return from a life annuity until age eighty. Albrecht and Maurer (2002)
show that by self-annuitizing retirees face a quite substantial risk ofoutliving their assets.
Mitchell and Young (2002) show that by postponing annuitization, the retiree could
possibly gain from the improvement of the budget constraint together with the resolution
of uncertainty regarding one's future lifespan. In other words, retirees could be better off if
they self-annuitize today and then annuitize tomorrow. Things like an increase in interest
rates, better asset allocation and liquidity features, possible tax-law changes, or a reduction
in actuarial loads will all serve to increase the future annuity payout if the retiree waits and
is sufficiently risk tolerant.
Several studies have explored the impact of bequest motives on annuitization, but their
findings are controversial. Bernheim (1991) presents empirical evidence that the private
saving is strongly influenced by the desire to leave bequests. Contrary to the accidental
bequest hypothesis and the life-c1,cle theory, a typical household will chose to annuitize
less than 100 percent of its resources, even if the insurance markets were perfect. Brown
(2001) measures bequest motives as an intention to leave a bequest and finds no effect on
annuitization decisions.
Another branch of the literature addresses insurance loads and adverse selection. Ten
years ago, voluntary private annuity markets in the U.S. had a total loading on a nominal
63
annuity worth almost 20 cents per dollar of premium for a 65 year old male, and 15 cents for
a 65 year old female. These loadings have come down substantially in recent years (Brown
et al. 2000). A major source of these load factors is adverse selection-in this context the
tendency of annuitants to live longer than non-annuitants, since individuals who know that
they are likely to die soon do not purchase annuities. Higher risk individuals self-select
themselves into insurance contracts in two ways: t'active selectiont'-consumer knowledge
of health status affects annuity purchasers and "passive selection"-annuitants differ from
non-annuitants (but do not act on this). Mitchell et al. (1999) and Brown, Mitchell and
Poterba (2000) show that adverse selection is responsible for an 8-12 percent reduction
in annuity payouts and for 3-5 percent increase in administrative costs. They conclude
that "the observed load factors are not large enough by themselves to explain the almost
complete lack of annuity demand by U.S. households."
Brown, Mitchell and Warshawsky (1999) apply a standard model of consumer behavior
to estimate the utility consequences of various tax rules for annuity products and find that
the current system does not substantially alter the alternative attractiveness of taxable
bonds and annuity products.
Some studies (Bernheim (1991) Mitchell and Moore (1999)) argue that people are al-
ready overannuitized by Social Security and that benefits from additional annuitization are
reduced. Bernheim (1991) and Hau (2000) suggest that life insurance is bought to offset the
mandatory annuitization by the Social Security. On the contrary, Brown (1999) presents
substantial evidence that the reason the elderly individuals with bequest motives hold life
insurance is not to offset the annuitization imposed by the Social Security. The same pa-
per offers (but does not test) alternative hypotheses for insurance holdings: inertia from
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insurance decisions earlier in life, pre-payment of death-expenses or income provision for a
widowed spouse. However, Brown and Warshawsky (2001) show that the presence of Social
Security and DB pension plans, cannot, by itself, explain why individuals do not choose to
annuitize all of their retirement resources.
Brovrn (2001) investigates the choice of a lump sum over a monthly pension (annuity)
from a DC plan using the standard life-cycle model. He develops a measure of annuity value
based on the additional wealth that must be given to a person in the absence of annuity
markets, so that he or she could achieve the same level of utility if he or she had access
to annuities. This is called Annuity Equivalent Wealth (AEW). Brown finds that AEW is
positively correlated with the likelihood of annuitizing. Since much of the variation in the
expected annuity decision is left unexplained by the life-cycle model, other measures, which
were entered linearly, are also analyzed. For example self-reported poor health conditions
decrease the probability of annuitization, but an excellent condition of health does not have
a significant effect. Brown (2001) shows that the life-cycle model does not predict anuuity
decisions for those with self-reported short time horizons for financial decision making.
In summary, the existing literature has focused both on the reasons for the thinness
of the annuity market and on the determinants of the annuitization decisions. Why so
few people buy prila: J annuities is not well understood to date. Based on the standard
approach to economic behavior, the previous research has identified important determinants
of annuitization decisioru, but has left much of the variation unexplained. Also the variables
that one would expect to explain who annuitizes (for example bequest motives, health,
education) do not.
Life annuities differ from the typical investment since once purchased they can never
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be terminated or sold. Is it the case that a non-standard type of investment requires a
non-standard approach? One of the main goals of my paper is to motivate the need to
look beyond the standard approach, while trying to explain who buys private annuitizes
a^nd who does not. There are views that psychological research can play an important
role in understanding economic activity: "Many psychological findings are robust enough,
tractable enough and of enough potential economic importance that we ought to begin to
integrate them into economics," Rabin (1998). That is what I do in this study. I start off
by revisiting the standard approach and identifying its flaws.
2.3 Standard approach to annuities
2.3.L The Annuity Equivalent Wealth Measure
The standard approach to annuities involves determining the value of annuitization in the
context of Yaari's life-cycle model.T Here I use the most current technique to measure the
value of an annuity in the life-cycle model: Annuity Equivalent Wealth (AEW), developed
in Mitchell et al. (1999) and in Brown (2001).8 This section describes the AEW measure,
discusses the factors that cause its variation and reviews the results in Brown (2001), the
most recent study on annuitization decisions using this framework. The following sections
show how this measure can be used to augment the standard approach with psychological
factors about human behavior.
According to the life-cycle model, an individual maximizes expected utility with respect
TThe money's worth (Mitchell et al. (1999)) is another standard approach, but it ignores the value of
Iongevity insurance.
8Actually Mitchell et al. (1999) talk about Weatth Equivalent, which is the reciprocal of Annuity Equiva-
lent Wealth when there are no pre-existing annuities. For compa.risons of the two measures see the discussion
in Brown et al. (2001).
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to consumption, given her initial wealth Ws and subject to a non-negativity constraint on
wealth. Under the assumption of additive separability over time, the problem becomes:
mvv(wt) : mexEtf-ff.' B'u,(qf (2.1)ct '' ct L ,:-:t J
s.t. W1
Wt+l 
- 
(Wt-C1+,Sr*At)(1 +r), (2.2)
where C1 is consumption; B is the rate of time preference, ? is the maximum possible life
span of an individual; r is the interest rate; W1 is non-annuitized wealth in period t, ,S1
is the pre.existing annuity palrnent from Social Security and DB pensions, and ,46 is the
actuarially fair annuity pa;rment that can be purchased when supplemental annuity markets
are available.
Assume that the individual, prior to arry optional annuitization, has financial wealth
W". In order to derive a measure of the value of annuitization two scenarios are considered.
Firstly if no supplemental annuities are available then Ws : W*, an.d At : O for every
t. Secondly, if annuities are available, the individual fully annuitizes all financial assets:
Ws : 0 and the size of the annuity, ,4.1 is determined by assuming that the expected
discounted value of ,41 equals to the initial premirtm W*:
T-aee*l f ^ t Iw*: t lTfutll(1-si)1, (2.3)7=' L( r:'l I
where gj is the one-period mortality hazard, i.e. the probability of dying before period
f* 1, conditional on surviving to period t (and is specific for each birth cohort and gender)
and r is the interest rate.g
eNote that all variables in the model are in real terms.
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Finding the maximum utility requires dynamic programming techniques. The Bellman
equation is:
2ax V(W) - max Ut(C) + P (L - et+r) V+t(Wt+t)
Note that if consumers are a,ssumed to exhibit constant relative risk aversion (1) i.e.:
(2.4)
(2.6)
(2.5)
then the maximization problem becomes invariant to the scale of wealth. However, the
proportion of pre-annuitized wealth does matter for the value of additional annuitization
(Brown (2001)).
The above maximization problem is solved for the case with annuities and with no
annuities. If there is access to annuity markets, the maximization routine has two steps.
First, the maximum utility is found as a function of the proportion of assets to be annuitized,
and then the proportion that yields maximum utility is chosen.lO The AEW is calculated
from the following equation:
rrL-l
Ut(C) 
- h,,'y)0,,t/ 1,
Vy(AEW x Wa)noann 
- 
Vo(Wo) u""
Basically the AEW tells us by how much individual wealth should be multiplied in order
to generate the same utility as if ihe initial wealth was invested in annuities. For example,
imagine that an individual starts off with $100,000 in annuities and has utility Ux. If the
access to annuity markets was to be taken away, the individual would need (for example)
$130,000 to generate utility equal to U*. The AEW is simply the ratio of $130,000 and
$100,000. If the AEW is one the consumer is indifferent. If the AEW is greater than 1, then
loThe model is adapted so that it takes into account the pre-annuitized wealth, such as Social Security
and DB pensions.
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the consumer values annuities, since his or her utility is higher under annuitization.ll In
other words, the AEW reflects the fact that people buy annuities if they value the insurance
against outliving their assets.
In the case of married couples, the procedure is the same, but couples are assumed to
make joint decisions.l2 Brovrn and Wa,rshawsky (1999) and Brown (2001) calculate the
AEW for couples under the assumption that a couple maximizes a joint utility function
that is the weighted sum of the utility of the two individuals, while allowing for economies
of scale in consumption.
It is important to highlight that the above model ignores bequest motives, although
the desire to leave an inheritance might play a crucial role in annuitization decisions. The
existing literature has not settled on a way that bequest motives should be incorporated into
annuity demand models (Mitchell and McCarthy (2002)). I have decided to leave bequest
motives out of the model, because there are ways to ensure that annuities will outlast
their owner. Married persons can buy a "joint and last survivor annuitf', which continues
payments as long as one of the spouses is alive. There are also annuities with a guaranteed
minimum term-10, 15 or 20 years. So if the person dies prematurely, payments continue
to beneficiaries for up to 10, 15 or 20 years. The drawback is that the annuity payrnents
are reduced.
Looking at the above model, we see that heterogeneity in the AEW is coming from:
mortality risk q1; risk aversion 7; assets that are already annuitized 51; expected age of
retirement (this is the "age" in Eq. (2.1); and marital status (because of the differences in
llNote that because of the insurance protection that annuities offer, the wealth in the no annuities case
is always greater than the one with annuities available, i.e. AEW is never less than one.
l2Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) talk about family risk pooling.
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the utility functions for single individuals and married couples). The AEW depends also
on the following fixed parameters: the iuterest tate r, and the rate of time preference B.
The following question arises from this method: Why not leave the optimization problem
aside, and just include those factors that determine how much people value annuities as a
regressors? Brown (2001) tests the reduced form regression against the AEW and concludes
that the AEW captures complicated interactions between marital status, risk aversion etc.
that can not be captured otherwise.
2.3.2 Weaknesses of the Annuiff Equivalent Measure
The AEW measure has several conceptual and measurement problems. Throughout this
paper I focus on the latter, but the former are worthwhile mentioning. The conceptual
problems stem from the assumptions of the standard economic model that people have
time-consistent preferences, that they are rational and their behavior can be characterized
as the solution to a discounted dynamic optimization problem. However, there is evidence
that people behave in a way that contradicts the neoclassical theory. For example, Graham
and Isaac (2002) find support for the behavioral life-cycle theory of Shefrin and Thaler
(1983), while O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) present evidence that preferences are time
inconsistent and that people have self-control problems. Although researchers have doc-
umented anomalies in people's behavior, there is no alternative to the standard life'cycle
theory. In this paper I expand on this standard approach.
The AEW also suffers from measurement problems and previous research has addressed
some of these. Firstly, there are factors excluded from the AEW that matter for annuitiza-
tion. The AEW, for example, depends on the individual probability of survival, but such
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data is not available and all people are assigned the survival probability for their birth co-
hort and gender. A person suffering from a serious illness is less likely to annuitize, but this
is not reflected in his or her probability of survival. Brown (2001) takes into consideration
these other factors and estimates the following probit model:
Pr(Annu'ityi 
- 
1) 
- 
f (AEW;, Z) * et (2.7)
Brown (2001) uses data from the HRS and includes the following variables in Z; h.ealt}r
status, education, wealth, bequests and subjective survival probabilities. Brown finds that
marry of the variables that one would expect to matter for annuitization do not matter.
For example excellent/good health, education, bequest motives, and subjective survival
probabilities are all insignificant. Interestingly, most of the results in the above paper
are obtained afiber controlling for myopia and its interaction with the AEW.13 People who
answered that their financial planning period is one year or less are classified as short-
sighted or myopic. Brown compares the question about the financial planning horizon in
the HRS with other questions in the HRS that elicit information about discount rates, and
shows that the time horizon question can not be interpreted as a discount rate. Another
explanation of how people can be "myopic" and still exhibit optimizing behavior offered in
Brown (2001) is that severe illness could lead to a shorter life expectancy and therefore to
a shorter financial horizon. But this does not explain why the myopia/AEW interaction
is still significant afrber controlling for health status. The AEW clearly has measurement
issues, but interacting it with myopia is not going to undo that. However, the fact that
13The exact question from HRS is: "In deciding how much of their (family) income to spend or save,
people are likely to think about different financial planning periods. In planning your (family's) saving and
spending, which of the time periods Iisted in the booklet is most important to you?"
7L
this particular HRS time horizon variable is predictive, gives grounds to believe that there
might be a connection between psychological factors and annuitization.
The second set of measurement issues is related to the way the AEW is parameterized.
For example, all previous studies (including this one) assume that individuals have an
identical rate of time preference. But people differ in the way they discount future utility.
I address this issue in the following section.
2.4 Additional Considerations: Are Patient People More Likely
to Annuitize?
This section introduces additional factors that are fully consistent with standard theory. I
am adding to the AEW framework variables which a,re proxies for patience.
There is evidence that people differ in their rates of time preference, i.e. people are
not equally patient. Becker and Mulligan (1997) develop a model of patience formation in
which future pleasures or utilities have different levels of vividness in a person's imagination.
The individual is assumed to put higher value on more vivid utilities and lower value on
less vivid ones. To model this Becker and Mulligan (1997) assume that the rate of time
preference, B, is a function of the resources (,9) spent on imagining future activities, i.e.
0: 0@).
p(s) ) o, p'(s) > o, p" (s) ( o, for s > o (2.s)
,S is determined from one side by time and effort spent appreciating future pleasures and
from the other by spending on certain goods. The idea behind this that even rational people
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may heavily discount future utilities, but they might spend resources to offset this. Stated
differently, people can learn how to be patient. One of the main predictions of Becker and
Mulligan (1997) is that patience and wealth are correlated and that it is possible to distin-
guish a "wealth causes patience" hypothesis from a "patience causes wealth?' hypothesis.
Becker and Mulligan (1997) conclude that wealth causes patience. The main rea.son is that
in their model some determinants of time preference are endogenous and since many invest-
ments in future--oriented capital may occur during childhood, it is likely that richer parents
have resources to make the investments.l4
Patient people would value the future more and their AEW would be affected by patience
through the rate of time preference. This suggests that people with rich parents will be
more likely to purchase annuities. I will test this by including parental wealth in the vector
of variables Z inBq. (2.7).
2.5 Does Overconfidence Explain Annuitization Decisions?
2.5.L What is Overconfidence?
Standard economic theory assumes that, when faced with uncertainty, people correctly form
their subjective probabilistic assessments, according to the law of probabilities. However,
there is evidence that people are biased in their judgments. Researchers have documented
many systematic departures from rationality in judgment under uncertainty, and have shown
that in some cases people learn how to correct biases, but in other cases they do not (Rabin
(1ee8)).
raBecker and Mulligan (1997) also provide a review of empirical studies that emphasizes their prediction
that the wealthy are more patent.
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There is a large body of evidence from cognitive psychological experiments showing that
individuals overestimate their own abilities in various contexts.ls One can objectively say
that people misperceive the odds systematically, i.e.
actual od,d,s + E (+| (perce'iued, ,aar,)) ,\" r / (2.e)
where N is the number of the people. For example, people overestimate the length of their
life span: E(L) > p,L) whereI is the life length and p,7 is the mean of length of life.
Benabou and Tirole (2002) develop a model of why people value their self-image, and of
how they seek to enhance or preserve it through a variety of seemingly irrational behaviors:
from handicapping their own performance to practicing self-deception through selective
memory or aril/areness management. The same study gives three reasons why overestimation
of ability may be more advantageous than a realistic assessment. The first one is that people
derive utility from thinking well of themselves. The second one is that believing that one
possesses certain qualities makes it easier to convince others of that. And third is that a
confident person is more likely to undertake more ambitious goals and persist in the face of
adversity. Also, once in place, confidence may give an incentive to the individual to build
up and maintain his self-esteem.
Summarizing findings in psychology, Benabou and Tirole (2002, p. 87a) conclude that
people "rate their own probabilities as above average for favorable future life events, and
below average for unfavorable ones; the more controllable these events through their future
actions, the more so."
15For more details about the overconfidence and its relevance to finance see Daniel, Hirshleifer and Sub-
rahmanyam (1998).
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2.5.2 What is the Relevance of Overconfidence for the Demand for An-
nuities?
Before I explain how overconfidence relates to the demand for annuities, I want to give an
example of the famous lemons problem and use it to illustrate the way the annuity market
functions. Think for a moment about the market for a used car. Used cars can be one
of two types-good or bad (lemons). Really bad cars might sell for close to nothing and
really good ones, for $10,000. The owner of the car is the only one who knows the quality
of the car-there is asymmetric information. The owner knows that his car is in very good
condition and asks for $8,000, but the potential buyer is willing to pay only the average price
of $5,000. By that logic all owners selling their cars for more than $5,000 would withdraw
from the market. Only cars in a range of $0 and $5,000 would be available. Again potential
buyers would be willing to pay an average price of $2,500. and again sellers of cars that
cost more than that would leave. Only "lemons" would stay. By that logic the market for
used cars would break down. As we all know in practice it does not, if sellers find a way to
reveal the quality of their cars (for example getting the opinion of an independent expert,
etc.) and the information becomes more s;rmmetric.
Now let's replace the cars in our example with annuities and the sellers with individ-
uals/retirees. There is a well-developed market for annuities and it functions due to the
pooling of mortality risks. The size of the annuity payment is based on the amount invested,
and on the buyer's age and gender, the only factors observable by the insurance company.
Women receive less each month because they tend to live longer. Instead of life tables, the
insurance companies use "annuitant tables" to determine the mortality risk (these tables
(c
play the role of the independent expert in the car example). The annuitant tables reflect
the fact that mortality probabilities for both men and women in the general population at
every age are higher than the mortality probabilities for annuity purchasers. Mitchell et
al. (1999) discusses the reasons behind those differences: first, individuals with higher than
average net worth may live longer and second, conditional on net worth, the annuity buyers
may live longer on average than those who do not.
If we were to believe the findings in the psychology literature, people overestimate
their own abilities and perceive themselves more favorably than they are viewed by others.
Therefore, the annuity purchasers are those who overestimate the probability to live a
long life, or more precisely to live longer than the average life span. Overconfidence is
compounded by the lemons problem.
2.5.3 How Do We Measure Overconfidence?
Are people more optimistic than warranted about their life spans?16 In what follows, I show
how measures of overconfidence or optimism could be constructed.
The first set of overconfidence measures are simply the differences between self-reported
subjective probability of survival and implied probability from life tables. I consider both
life tables for the general population and for anmritants. These measures tell us if the person
has an estimate of his life expectancy higher than the life table. However, this might be
because of overconfidence or private information, or a combination of the two. For example,
longevity in one's family may lead to higher life expectancy.
tousiog information from the HRS, Hurd and McGa,rry (1997) show that subjective survival probabilities
predict actual survival and that people modify their survival probabilities based on new information. Smith,
Taylor and Sloan (2001) also find the same relationship between subjective probabilities and actual survival,
and that they a.re updated with new health information, but do not appea.r to reflect all the information
that respondents know about their longevity prospects.
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I develop a measure of optimism, which potentially allows me to separate private infor-
mation from overconfidence. This measure is based on the difference between the probability
of surviving and the subjective probability of surviving. The probability of surviving de-
pends on several factors, which are divided into two groups. The first group, X1, consists
of variables that are used by the insurer to set the price of annuities-gender and age. The
second group, X2, includes variables that are observable by the researcher, but not used by
the insurer-for example: wealth, health, education, parental variables, etc. Finally, there
are factors that are not observable by either the researcher or the insurer, but that affect
the probability of surviving-e2. Let Suru,iue : O if the person dies between period 1 and
period 2, and Suru'iue: 1 otherwise.
Suruzue* : Xt7t * Xz7z * ez (2.10)
We also observe the subjective probability of surviving, ^9P, which depends not only on
Xt,Xz, and e2, but also possibly on a set of observable characteristics, X3, that do not
affect probability of surviving, but do capture overconfidence:
S P 
- 
X1(h + rt) + Xz(02 * :yz) + Xs(t) + e2 * e3, (2.11)
where'|1 aud?2measuretheperceptionof theimpactof X1 and X2onsurvival; e3isthe
unobservable counterpart to &.
After estimating Eq. (2.10) and Eq. (2.11) I form the following measure of overconfi-
dence:
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Ouerconf i,dence 
- 
XtT * Xzjz * Xsjs. (2.r2)
The standard economic view is that people who are going to die early will not buy
annuities. But if people are optimistic about the length of their life spans, they will buy
annuities. I examine the role of overconfidence in annuitization decisions in Section 2.73.17
2.6 Data, Dependent Variables and Pararneterization of the
Model
I use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to explore the alternative expla-
nations for individuals' unwillingness to purchase annuities.l8 The HRS is a longitudinal
study that focuses on persons born between 1931 and 1941. The survey has data on approx-
imately 12,600 individuals and consists of five waves, conducted in 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998
and 2000. Most of the people in the sample are still facing retirement decisions. There are
enough questions to do standard economic analysis and to go beyond the standard model.lg
I look at people who are still working in Wave 1 of the survey and are about to make
choices about the form in which they will be receiving their pension benefits. In the HRS,
52 percent of those who are currently working are covered by pension or retirement plans
sponsored by the employer (this also includes thrift, savings, 401(k) etc., but not Individual
17Note that overconfidence is not the only factor that matters for annuitizing. The model that I estimate
in Section 2.7.3 includes the AEW, that measures the value of annuity in the life--cycle model and that takes
into account the pre-annuitized wealth.
18I am also using the supplemental file: "Pension Present Value Database" (Level 1), by Bob Peticolas
and Tom Steinmeier, July 15, 1999.
leThe downside of the HRS is that many of the innovative questions (for example questions about savings
and consumption behavior) are posed to only a small group ofrespondents and are practically useless when
the sample of interest is different.
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Retirement Accounts (IRA) and Keogh).20 65.6 percent of those with pension plans have
DB plans, whereas 54.2 percent have DC plans. People with DB plans are annuitized by
default, but people with DC plans usually can choose to receive a lump-sum settlement or
monthly pension (we call the latter an annuity) when they retire. The sample I work with
consists of L45 single individuals who have at least oue DC pension plan with a balance of
at least $5,000 that provides an annuity option.2l More details about the sample selection
criterion are provided in Appendix 2.1.
The dependent variable is a latent variable "plan to annuitize DC balances if given a
choice", which is one if the person said that he or she prefers an annuity over a lump sum
payment as a form of retirement benefits.
In order to relate my study to the previous literature I parameterize the model described
in Section 2.3 in the following way: the interest rate r, is assumed to be 3.0 percent; the
inflation rate r is 3.2 percent, which corresponds to the historical average over 1926-1995
as reported by Ibbotson Associates (1996); and the rate of time preference, B is assumed
to be (0.03-1). Depending on responses to HRS questions about gambling with future
income, people are assigned one of the following rates of risk aversion: 5.O, 2.9, 1.5 and
0.7 .22 Mortality rates come from http: //www.demog.berkeley.edu.
2oThe survey asks detailed questions about the types, benefits, and balances of as many as three retirement
plans. The exact question is: "In some retirement plans, Type A, benefits are usually based on a formula
involving age, yeaxs of service and salarJr. In other plans, Tlpe B, money is accumulated in an account for
you.) Is your (first/next) plan Tlpe A or Type B?" Type A plans have been treated as Defined Benefit (DB)
plans and type B plans as DC plans. Note that 401-K, 40&B, ESOP, SRA, Thrift/Savings, and Stock/Profit
sharing are all Tlpe B retirement plans.
21Note that this is the same sample as in Brown (2001), but that I work with single individuals only.
22See Brown (2001) for more details.
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2.7 Empirical Results
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for selected rariables. Almost 63 percent of the
sample are intending to annuitize. Not surprisingly the mean of risk aversion and the level
of wealth are higher for future annuitants. I present my empirical results in the following
sections.
2.7.L Revisiting Yaari's Model
I start off by estimating the effect of variables, that are in the spirit of Yaari's model,
but that to my knowledge have not been explored before. In order to link my study to
the previous literature, I replicate some of the regressions in Brown (2001): the first three
columns of Table 2.2. T explore the effect of wealth quartiles in column 4 and find that at
the margin, people from higher wealth quartiles are less likely to annuitize than people from
the lowest quartile.23 Since people with a big share of the net worth in housing equities
could possibly obtain annuity income by the so called "reverse mortgage" (Venti and Wise
(2001)), I include the share of housing equities in column 5, but do not find any effect.2a I
expected to see that people who smoke are less likely to annuitize (if one is willing to believe
that smokers have lower life expectancy), but on the contrary I find a marginally positive
effect.
23I could not find any impact of intentions to leave a bequest on annuitization, after controlling for received
bequests.
2aVenti and Wise (2001) find that "home equity is not liquidated to support general non-housing con-
sumption needs as households age."
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2.7.2 The Effect of Parental Experiences on Annuitization Decisions
Participants in the HRS are asked if they think that the financial situation of their parents is
excellent, good, fair, somewhat poor or very poor.25 In my data set I have a dummy variable
that indicates whether at least one of the parents is rich. Unfortunately, no information on
parental wealth is available for deceased parents. About 43 percent of the single individuals
in my sample have lost both of their parents, so I am left with 82 single individuals.
The "wealth creates patience, creates demand for annuities" hypothesis is tested by
looking at two individuals, who have exactly the same characteristics, except one grew up
in a rich family and the other in a poor family. I start by testing if people with rich parents
are less likely to annuitize their DC balances simply because they expect to receive an
inheritance.26 Th" results from column 3 of Table 2.3 show that having a rich parent, while
controlling for expected inheritance, has an overall negative significant effect on annuitizing,
which is to be expected. A related hypothesis is that rich parents may offer help in the case
of severe health or other financial problems. To test this I use the question: "Suppose you
ran into severe financial problems in the future. Do you have relatives or friends who would
be both willing and able to help you out over a long period of time?" Again the overall
effect of a rich parent, controlling for "financial help", is negative and significant (column
5 of Table 2.3).'7 The last column of Table 2.3 shows that, after controlling for expected
25The third wave of the HRS has a question about parents' savings for retirement, but it was asked of a
sample of only eight hundred people, most of who do not meet my sample selection criteria.
26The questions about the expected inheritances were asked in Wave 2. Expected inheritances in year
1994 are not the same as expected inheritances in yea.r 1992, and I have to worry about the measurement
error.
27In all regressions in Table 2.2,the educational dummies appear to be negative and significant._ I have
no explanation for that so far. Education does not belong in the standard model, but since my goal was to
build on the existing literature, I have kept education in the regressions. Brown (2001) finds a positive, but
not highly significant effect of college education, without controlling for myopia (when myopia is included,
the study does not report education coefficients).
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inheritance and financial help, having a rich parent has a negative and significant effect on
annuitizing. This result goes against the "patience" hypothesis.28
2.7.3 The Effect of Overconfidence on Annuitization Decisions
I start by exploring the effect of overconfidence, measured as the deviation of a respondent's
self-reported probability from the implied probability from the life tables.2e The HRS asks
questions about the subjective probabilities of survival to age 75 and age 85. Let "over75"
be the difference between the respondent's self-reported probability of living to age 75 and
the implied probability from the life tables that someone of the respondent's age and gender
will live to be 75. Similarly, "ann-over75" is the difference between the respondent's self-
reported probability of living to age 75 and the implied probability from the "annuitant"
tables. The variable "over75t' has no effect on annuitization, but the "ann-over7S" does
have a positive and significant effect on annuitizing DC balances (Table 2.4, column 1,
3). This tells us that people will annuitize if they believe that they will live longer than
other annuitants, but not if their life expectancy is higher than the one for the general
population. As it has been already discussed, "annuitant" life tables reflect the fact that
annuitants live longer than the general population.3o The results remain the same if the
subjective probabilities of survival to age 85 are used instead of the subjective probabilities
of survir,ral to age 75 (Table 2.4, column 2, 4). All of the above measures are capturing both
28It would have been very useful if I knew something about the financial situation of the parents who
are already deceased at the time of the survey. By looking only at people with deceased paxents, one could
separate out the patience effect, since all other hypothesis could be ruled out-
2eThese measures could also be capturing private information. I differentiate between the tvro by using
another measure of overconfidence at the end of this section.
3oI do not have data on annuitant mortality rates. As an approximation I have estimated them by dividing
the mortality rates for the general population by 1.9. I have obtained that number simply by comparing the
two mortality rates for selected ages in Tb,ble 2 in Mitchell ei al. (1999). The estimates do not change if I
apply the ratio of annuitant and non-a,nnuitant mortality for each age group.
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private information and overconfidence about longevity prospects.
The measure implied by Eq. (2.12) captures "pure" overconfidence. All variables in
X1 and X2 are identical to those used in Table 10 in Hurd and McGarry (1997). As X3
I use the variable "deceased parent" (a dummy variable, which equals one if at least one
of the parents is deceased, and zero otherwise). The "deceased parentt' is an exclusionary
restriction, i.e. it is significant in Eq. (2.11), and not significant in Eq. (2.10). I define
"overconftt and "overconfl" as explained in Section 2.5.3. No exclusionary restrictions, X3,
were used in "overconf". None of the above measures plays a significant role in predicting
annuitization decisions. Therefore, I reject the hypothesis that the overconfidence is a
predictor for annuitization.
I find that people who intend to annuitize believe that they will live longer than the po'
tential pool of annuitants. I offer two explanations: private information and overconfidence.
Since my measure of "purett overconfi.dence is not a significant determinant of annuitization,
I conclude that people who have private information about their life spans are more likely to
annuitize their DC balances. People who are pessimistic and do buy annuities are counter
to the standard economic model. This adds to the puzzle.
2.8 Conclusions and F\rture Directions
In this paper I ask who are the people buying life annuities and what kinds of models should
we use to study the demand for annuities. I augment the standard life-cycle model rvith
additional considerations. My data comes from the Health and Retirement Survey. I focus
on people who are still working and are facing the decision either to annuitize their DC
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pension balances or to take a lump sum.
I reject the hypothesis that growing up in a rich family makes a person more patient
and, therefore, more likely to annuitize. On the contrary, having a rich parent controlling
for expected inheritances (or expected financial help) reduces the odds of annuitizing.
I develop several measures of overconfidence and use these to test if overconfidence in
one's life span has an impact on annuitization. I find that people who believe that they
would live longer than other potential annuitants are more likely to annuitize their DC
pension plan balances. However, people may be optimistic about their life spans for two
reasons: overconfidence and private information. I develop a measure of "puret' optimism
and find that it is not significant for annuitization. This suggests that it is the private
information that drives annuitization decisions.
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Table 2.L: Summarv Statistics
Au Annuity-Q Annuity-1
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Will Annuitize DC Balances
AEW
Myopic
Pre-Annuitized Wealth
Risk Aversion
Retirement Age
Year of Birth
Female
Excellent Health
Very Good Health
Fair Health
Poor Health
Wealth (000's)
Education L2
Education 1315
Education 16*
Nonwhite
Children
Children at Home
Children Away
Bequest Very Important
Bequest Some Important
0.628 0.485
r.373 0. 120 r.352
0.228 A.42L 0.296
0.480 0.245 0.48
3.879 L.6r2 3.528
63.099 3.784 62.587
37.r24 3.082 36.537
0.628 0.485 0.593
0.317 0.467 0.389
0.372 0.485 0.296
0.048 0.2L5 0.056
0.021 0.143 0.037
4L2.604 724.313 388.892
0.255 0.437 0.204
0.255 0.437 0.278
0.4L4 0.494 0.463
0.243 0.430 0.278
0.772 0.42L 0.778
0.241 0.429 A.278
o.7 45 0.437 0.759
0.248 0.434 0.222
0.428 0.496 0.500
1.386 0.111
0.187 0.392
0.48 0.258
4.087 L.434
63.376 3.27
37.473 2.9
0.648 0.48
0.275 0.449
0.418 0.496
0.044 0.206
0.011 0.105
426.675 873.607
0.286 0.454
0.242 0.431
0.385 0.489
0.222 0.418
0.769 0.424
0.22 0.416
0.736 0.443
0.264 0.443
0.385 0.489
0.133
0.46L
0.223
1.835
4.583
3.312
0.496
0.492
0.461
o.23r
0.191
358.483
0.407
o.452
0.503
0.452
a.42
o.452
0.432
o.42
0.505
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Table 2.2: Variables in the Light of the Standard Model. Dependent Variable: Annuitize
Defined Contribution Balances, Given the Option
( 1) (2) (3) (6)(5)(4)
AEW
Myopic
ABW*Myopic
Education L2
trducation 1315
Education 16
Rate Subjective Health
Excellent
Very Good
Fair
Poor
Nonwhite
2nd Wealth Quartile
3nd Wealth Quartile
4nd Wealth Quartile
Proportion of Housing Equities
in Total Net Worth
Smoker
AEWxHouse
Wealth (100000 s)
Test I{6: Myopic-AEw*Myopic-0
X2
P value
Test .i16: Prop. of Housing
trquities 
- 
AEW*Proportion
of Housing Bquities-0
X2
P value
Observations
0.538 0.924 L.O7r 1.193 1.255 r.2t8(0.333) (0.384)* (0.407)** (0.428)** (0.617)* (0.42e)**
0.882 0.961 0.974 0.975 0.978(0.144)** (0.073)** (0.053)** (0.052)** (0.047)**
-r .954 -2.736 -2.976 -2.993 -3.052(0.876)* (1.082)* (1.102)** (1.117)x* (1.104)**
-0.098 -0.042 -0.038 -0.020(0.1s5) (0.18s) (0.1e1) (0.188)
-0 . 1 96 -0 .r25 -O .r24 -0.088(0.188) (0.1e3) (0.1e3) (0.1e4)
-0.243 -0.169 -0.167 -4.L29(0.171) (o.lso) (0.1s1) (0.183)
-0.L27 -0.114(o.r2r) (0 .123)
0.025 0.049(0.114) (0.115)
-0.130 -0.090(0.234) (0.231)
-0.398 -0.300(0.2s2) (0.u4)
-0.067 -0.064(0.106) (0.107)
-0.244
(0.132)
-0.233
(0.133)
-0.166
(0.141)
-0.110 -0.134(0.125) (0.126)
0.050 0.041(0.115) (0.116)
-0.090 -0.137(0.232) (0.238)
-0.302 -0.257(0.344) (0.35e)
-0.063 -0.060(0.107) (0.107)
-0.247 -0.258(0.134) (0.134)
-0.235 -0.255
(0. 134) (0. 135 )
-0.168 -0.164(0.142) (0.141)
o.2L5 -0.004(1.536) (o.oeo)
0.152
(o.oee)
-0.164
( 1.1 37)
L45
6.910
.032
0.001
(o.oo7)
7.970
0.019
8.680
0.013
r44
8.550
0.014
9.030
0.011
.030
.988
r44 L44
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at L07o; ** significant at 57o; *** significant at L%o
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Table 2.3: Parental Wealth, Parents Alive. Dependent Variable: Annuitize Defined
Contribution Balances, Given the Option
(6)(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
AtrW
Myopic
AEW*Myopic
Education L2
Education 1315
Education 16
Rate Subjective Health
Excellent
Very Good
Fair
Nonwhite
2nd Wealth Quartile
3nd Wealth Quartile
4nd Wealth Quartile
Rich Parents
Expects to Receive Inheritance
Counts on Receiving Financial Help
Rich Parents* Counts
on Receiving Financial Help
Rich Parents* Expects
to Receive Inheritance
2.385 2.09L(0.560)*** (0.661)**
1.000 1.000(o.ooo)*** (o.ooo)**
-3.205 -3.245
( 1.155)*** (1.178)**
-0.991 -0.987(0.027)*** (o.o1o)**
-0.997 -0.996(0.012)*** (o.oo4)**
-0.993 -0.979(0.036)*** (0.018)**
-0.210 -0.222(0.15e) (0.171)
0.006 -0.050(0.12e) (0.141)
-0.708 -0.600(0.324)** (0.635)
-o.L26 -0.186(0.133) (0.161)
-0.182 -0.110
(0. 176 ) (0. 163)
-0.045 -0.090(0.136) (0.144)
-0.128 -0.045
(0. 166) (0.141)
-0.103
(o.08e)
0.002
(0.001)
L.433 2.255(2.665) (0.673)**
1.000 1.000(o.ooo)** (o.ooo)x*
-L.577 -3.L97(3.084) (1.141)**
-0.927 -0.992(0.657) (o.oo5)**
-0.903 -0.996(0.750) (o.oo4)**
-0.745 -0.981(0.s77) (0.017)**
-0.426 -0.354(0.380) (0.1e8)
-0.L77 -0.055(0.258) (0.137)
-0.972 -0.934
(o .27 6)** (o .043 ) * *
-0.228 -0.303(0.2e6) (0.1e3)
-0.148 -0.079(0.262) (0.163)
-0.1L5 -0.035(0.21e) (0.12e)
-0.194 -0.054(0.307) (0.142)
-0.2L7 -0.172(0.2s4) (0.083)*
-0.002
(o.oo4)
-0.041
(o.o1e)*
0.005
(o.ooe)
-0.250 -0.297(0.185) (0.306)
-0.037 -0.056(o.os4) (0.104)
-0.987 -0.999(0.014)** (o.oo4)x*
-0.245 -0.312(0.1e5) (0.364)
-0.035 -0.009(o.oe2) (0.031)
0.006 -0.005(0.066) (0.018)
-0.044 -0.008(o.oe8) (o.o2e)
-0.735 -0.7L3
(0.235) ** (0.342)*
-0.000
(o.ooo)
-0.155 -0.019
(0. 121) (0.053)
0.137 0.015
(0.1 12) (0.043)
0.000
(o.oo1)
L.227
(0.573)*
1.000
(o.ooo) **
-1.695
(o.es4)
-0.998
(0.015)**
-0.998
(0.025)**
-0.968
(0.172)**
0.179
(0.415)
1.000
(o.ooo) **
-0.245
(o.600)
-0.990
(0.162)**
-0.843
(1.2s6)
-0.788
(1.007)
Test .F/s: Rich Parents- Rich Parents*Expects to Receive Inheritance:0
x2 6.360
P value .042
Test .I/6: Rich Parents- Rich Parents* Counts on Receiving Financial Help-Q
X2
P value
22.920
.000
Test .F/6: Rich Parents
x2
P value
Observations
Counts on Rec. Fin. Help- Rich ParentsxExpect to Receive Inheritance:0
60.430
.000
7L7L 79 79 70
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at lOTo; ** significant at 5To; *** significant at tYo
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Table 2.4: Parental Wealth, Parents Alive. Dependent Variable: Annuitize Defined
Contribution Balances, Given the Option
(6)(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
AEW
Myopic
AEW*Myopic
Over75
AEW-Over75
Education L2
Education 1315
Education 16
Black
Wealth (100000 s)
Over85
AEW*Over85
Overconfl
Aew-Overconfl
Overconf
AEW*Overconf
Ann-Over85
ABW*Ann-Over85
Ann-Over75
AEWxAnn-Over75
Test f/6: Overconfidence
-Overconfidence*AWE-0
X2
P value
Observations
0.420 -L.4L9(0.658) (1.27s)
0.913 0.939(0.116)** (0.091)**
-2.175 -2.4rL(0.881)* (0.903)**
-0.152 L.L57(0.740) (2.3s5)
0.947 0.974(0.082)** (0.054)**
-2.492 -2.979(0.920)** (1.126)**
0.257
(0.585)
0.903
(0.L27)***
-2.116
(0.888)**
-0.963
(0.101)***
L.229
(0.723)*
-0.004
(0.r74)
-0.104
(0.181)
-0.L72
(0.16e)
-0.110
(0.128)
0.001
(o.oo7)
1.068
(2.388)
0.974
(0.055)**
-2.970
(1.127)**
-0.043 -0.066(0.17e) (0.182)
-0.119 -0.185(0.185) (0.187)
-0.220 -0.250(0.170) (0.172)
-0.098 -0.075(0.127) (0.125)
0.001 0.001(o.oo7) (o.oo7)
-0.724
(0.340)*
0.853
(0.776)
0.014 0.011(0.180) (0.181)
-0.125 -0.121(0.187) (0.188)
-0.179 -A.L77(0.172) (0.173)
-0.026 -0.033(0.130) (0.12e)
0.004 0.004(o.oo8) (o.oo8)
-0.076
(0.187)
-0.L42
(0.1e2)
-0.250
(0.174)
-0.120
(0.127)
0.001
(o.oo7)
-0.043
(0.420)
-0.007
(0.306)
-0.034
(0.415)
-0.016
(0.302)
4.270
0.118
I45
1.330
0.514
I45
-0.800
(0.165)**
2.79L
(1.323)*
4.350
0.1 13
L45
-0.783
(0.195)**
1.615
(0.861)
5.530
0.063
L45
2.200 1.990
.330 .369
L44 L44
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at I0To; ** significant at 57o; *** significant at ITo
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Appendix 2.I: Sample Selection Criteria
Observations
Original Wavel
Have at Least One DC Plan, with
Have at Least One DC Plan. with
Single Individuals
Va1id Pre-Annuitzed Wealth
Valid Risk Averse Coefficient
Final Sample Size
an Option to Annuitize
Balancei $5000 and an Option
12652
L723
to Annuitize 940
153
r47
L45
L45
Appendix 2.2: Measures of Overconfidence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Survived between
Wavel and Wave2
Subjective
Probability
Survival to 75
Survived between
Wavel and Wave2
Subjective
Probability of
Survival to 75
2nd Family Income Quartile
3rd Family Income Quartile
Highest Family Income Quartile
2nd Family Net Worth Quartile
3rd Family Net Worth Quartile
Highest Family Net Worth Quartile
Age
Married
Nonwhite
Male
High Physical Activity L-2 Week
High Physical Activity 1-3 Month
High Physical Activity ( 1 Month
High Phvsical Activity Never
Light Physical Activity 1-2 Week
Light Physical Activity L-3 Month
Physical Activity ( 1 Month
Physical Activity Never
Former Smoker
Smoker
0.422
(0.237)
o.577
(0.253)*
0.550
(0.280)*
-0.367
(0.23e)
0.273
(0.258)
0.244
(0.27s)
0.099
(o.o2o)**
-0.272
(0.215)
0.646
(0.198)**
-0.870
(0.178)**
-0.378
(0.333)
-0.427
(0.353)
-1.058
(0.291)**
-1.282
(0.266)**
-0.330
(0.206)
-0.709
(0.28e)*
-0.2L6
(0.316)
-L.352
(0.297)**
0.092
(0.1e2)
-0.6L2
0.405
(0.222)*
0.555
(0.262)**
0.562
(o.3oe) *
0.426
(0.233)*
0.334
(0.26e)
0.082
(o.284)
-0.051
(0.021)**
0.196
(0.201)
-0.199
(0.le1)
-0.705
(0.187)***
-1.140
(0.618)*
-L.297
(0.620)**
-L.263
(0.557)**
-r.602
(0.522)***
-0.049
(0.240)
0.375
(0.385)
-0.507
(o.277)*
-0.874
(0.215)***
-o.647
(0.237)***
-0.894
(0.242)***
0.405
(o.222)
0.555
(0.262)*
o.562
(o.3oe)
o.426
(0.233)
0.334
(0.26e)
0.082
(0.284)
-0.051
(0.021)*
0.196
(0.201)
-0.199
(0. 1e1)
-0.705
(0.187)**
-1.140
(0.618)
-r.297
(0.620)*
-L.263
(0.557)*
-L.602
(0.522)**
-0.049
(0.240)
0.375
(0.385)
-0.507
(0.277)
-0.874
(0.215)**
-o.647(0.n7)**
-0.894
0.383
(0.238)
0.545
(o.254)*
0.558
(0.281)*
-0.354
(0.240)
4.274
(0.25e)
0.245
(0.280)
0.116
(o.o2o)**
-0.27r
(0.216)
0.610
(0.199)**
-0.875
(0.179)**
-0.375
(0.335)
-0.468
(0.356)
-1.070
(0.293)**
-L.296
(0.267)*$
-0.333
(0.207)
-0.688
(0.2e1) *
-0.159
(0.316)
-1.311
(0.298)**
0.116
(0.1e3)
-0.594
93
(0.213)** (0.242)** (0.214)**
Appendtx 2.2 Cont.: Measures of Overconfidence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Survived between Subjective
Wavel and Wave2 Probability
Survival to 75
Survived between
Wavel and Wave2
Subjective
Probability of
Survival to 75
Drinks ( 1 Day
Drinks t-2 Day
Drinks 3-4 Day
Drinks 5* Day
Less than High School
More than High School
High Blood Pressure
Diabetes
Cancer
Lung Disease
Hearth Attack
Angina
Congestive. Hearth Failure
Stroke
Arthritis
BMI Low
BMI High
Deceased Parent
Constant
Observations
R-squared
0.2L2
(0.188)
0.2L4
(0.301)
0.276
(0.41e)
0.027
(0.486)
4322
(0.200)
0.180
(0.22r)
-0.286
(0.175)
-0.398
(0.204)*
-L.647
(0.210)***
-0.278
(a.226)
-0.893
(0.254)***
0.439
(0.313)
-0.770
(0.326)**
-0.400
(0.28e)
0.130
(0.171)
-o.674
(0.346)*
-0.050
(0.1e7)
9.24L
(1.329) ***
t0275
0.529
(0.181)**
0.422
(0.2e3)
-0.224
Q.432)
-0.450
(0.664)
-4.707
(0.215)**
-0.169
(0.1e5)
-0.776
(0.L72)**
- 1 .046
(0.264) **
-1.159
(0.350)**
-L.4r2
(0.298) **
-r.824
(0.392)**
-1.856
(0.453) **
-2.458
(0.666)**
-0.706
(0.4s7)
-0.561
(0.169)**
-0.483
(0.42s)
-0.102
(0.17e)
-0.388
( 1 .145)
t0275
0.06
4.2L2
(0.188)
0.2r4
(0.301)
4.276
(0.41e)
0.027
(0.486)
0.322
(0.200)
0.180
(o.22r)
-0.286
(0.175)
-0.398
(0.204)
-L.647
(0.210)**
-0.278
(0.226)
-0.893
(0.254)*x
0.439
(0.313)
-0.770
(0.326)*
-0.400
(0.28e)
0.130
(0.171)
-o.674
(0.346)
-0.050
(0.1e7)
9.24r
(1.329)**
L0275
0.519
(0.182)**
0.398
(0.2e5)
-0.244
(o.434)
-0.L72
(0.673)
-0.650
(0.216)**
-0.157
(0.1e6)
-0.752
(0.173)**
-1.031
(0.266)**
-r.L22
(0.350)**
-L.429
(0.299)**
-1.857
(0.393)**
-L.799
(0.454)**
-2.469
(0.667)**
-0.583
(0.4ee)
-0.565
(0.170)**
-0.481
(o.42s)
-0.087
(0.17e)
-r.t47
(0.253)**
-0.342
( 1.14e)
IOI44
0.06
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at LOTo; ** significant at 57o; *** significant at LTo
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Chapter 3
Does Health Status of Parents
Affect Tbansfers from their
Children? Evidence from Mexico
3.1 Introductron
In this paper, I examine the relationship between Mexican parents' health status and money
transfers they receive from their adult children. Most people in developing countries, es-
pecially in older cohorts, depend on family members to help them in times of trouble. I
focus on Mexico in part because unlike richer countries with extensive government safety
nets, informal insurance in the form of, for example, private transfers is more prevalent.l
Not only is the Mexican population aging rapidly, but half of Mexico's 100 million citizens
have no health insurance.2 Although there are many uninsured pe.ple in the U.S., there
are government programs as Medicare and Medicaid that help the poor, the elderly and the
disabled. In contrast, Mexico has few formal insurance schemes. The main question I ask
lFor example, Wong and Espinoza (2002) show that in Mexico, for those 70 or older, assistance from kin
represents thirty-five percent oftotal income, compared to those aged 5G59, for whom intrafamily transfers
represent only nine percent of their income.
2Those with health insurance are covered prima.rily by the Mexican Social Security Insti-
tute (IMSS), the federal program for private-sector workers, and the Institute for Social Se-
curity and Services for the state workers (ISSSTE), the system for federal workers. Source:
http: //www.ssc. upenn. edu/mhas/english/projectlf. htm
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is whether children send more money home if their parents are in poor health. If so, do
mothers receive more transfers than fathers?
The case of Mexico is also of interest because twenty-three percent of Mexican families
have one or more children who have migrated to the U.S. or to other countries.3 Nearly one
Mexican in five regularly receives money from relatives employed in the U.S., making the
Mexico the largest repository of such remittances in the world, according to a poll sponsored
by the Inter-American Development Bank.a I ask whether private transfers from migrants
or from children residing in Mexico respond to their parents' health shocks.
Understanding the relationship between private transfers and health is valuable for sev-
eral reasons. It reveals how children decide to help frail parents in a country with a rapidly
growing older population and few formal insurance schemes. Studying the correlation be-
tween health and money transfers will also shed light on the motives behind private transfers.
We know little about the healthiness of the person and his/her propensity to receive
intrafamily financial assistance.5 There are papers that study how private transfers respond
to health shocks, but few of them consider a developing country.G Empirical evidence
about health/private-transfer connection is scarce because of limited data. In addition, the
development research has focused on remittances and the motives behind them.7 However,
in Mexico, for example, dc.:nestic transfers and remittances have equal shares in recipients'
3Author's calculations.
nsource: Thompson, Ginger, "Remittances to Mexico Exceed Investment as Source of Income," The New
York Times, Vol. 123 (52), October 28,2003.
sOne exception is the U.S. Health and Retirement Survey, but the U.S. is a rich colrntry and therefore
an outlier. The rest of the world is economically closer to Mexico than it is to the U.S. F\rrthermore, the
financial issues faced by the elderly in Mexico differ from those faced by the elderly in the U.S.
6Murrugarra (2002) examines the link between remittances, public transfers and health care use in Ar-
menia. Cox et al. (1998) finds that being ill in the last four weeks raises the probability of transfer receipt
by more than five percentage points.
TTbansfers from children who have migrated to urban areas or abroad are also called remittances.
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household income.
I use the Mexican Health and Aging
health problems on private transfers from
Study (MHAS) to explore the effect of parents'
their children. This brand new data set contains
detailed information on chronic diseases and private transfers between children and parents.
The MHAS is a large, nationally representative study of the cohort of 13 million Mexicans
born before 1951.
My key findings are that mother's health status matters for transfers from children, but
father's health status has no impact on transfers. These are consistent with the theory
that children care for their parents because they might be expecting them to provide child-
care to their own children. Since grandmothers provide more care to young childreu than
grand.fathers, then it matters whether the elderly parent in question is male versus female.8
These results have an important policy implication. If children are helping their parents in
exchange for childcare, then the introduction of new public programs for elderly support is
unlikely to reduce the flow of private transfers.
Who offers financial support to sick parents: the children that remained in Mexico or the
migrants? I find that the marginal effect on transfers of the percentage of children working
in the U.S. is much higher than the marginal effect of the percentage of children working
in Mexico. This result is consistent with the capital market failures in Mexico. Most of
the families with low socioeconomic status do not have access to credit either because the
Mexican financial institutions have no interest in serving them or because high transaction
costs make borrowing less affordable. International migration could be a way to finance
peaks in household consumption.
8lndeed, using longitudinal Canadian and Finnish data, Lahdenpera et al. (2004) show that older women
are essential to the survival of the species.
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My results are applicable to developing countries, where private transfers from young
to old are more prevalent and the level of social support for the elderly is low. In developed
countries the direction of private transfers is usually from parents to children.
This paper consists of seven sections. Section 3.2 discusses the connection between
health and private transfers. Section 3.3 offers a literature review. Section 3.4 discusses
Mexican institutions. Section 3.5 describes the data and the basic relationship between
parental health and transfers from children. Section 3.6 presents the results from estimation
and the last section presents the conclusions.
3.2 The Connection between Private Thansfers from Chil-
dren and Parents' Health
This section develops an analytical framework of private transfers from children to parents.
What incentive would a child have to finance health care for his/her elderly parent? To
answer this question I consider three generations. Let G stand for the grandparent gener-
ation, P for the parent generation, and K for the grandchild generation.e If children are
altruistic towards their parents then the model presented in Appendix 3.1 predicts that a
deterioration of G's health leads to an increase of transfers from Ps.
However, in reality, altruism is from old to young, otherwise the species will die out.
Although children may care about the well-being of their parents, it is usually the case that
parents care about their children. Another possible motive why transfers from children
occur is exchange. For example, an adult child might help his/her parents financially in
eNote that the Gs are the respondents in my sample and Ps are their children.
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exchange for childcare. I
these grandparents care
argue that children care for their parents, because they know that
for their grandchildt"t.lo
G--rP-K
but also if
G-K
then
P --- G.
A grandmother, even though she can no longer bear children herself, has a decidedly
beneficial effect on the reproductive success of her children and the survival of her grand-
children. Therefore, it matters whether the elderly parent in question is male rather than
female. This is called the grandmother hypothesis.
Assume that G takes care of grandchildren, for as long as G is healthy. Let H be the
level of G/s health, under which he/she cannot provide childcare. A transfer, ? will possibly
help a sick G to recover:
H-H(T)*Ho,
where ,F/o is the exogenous part of. G' s health H.
Assume that P maximizes his/her expected utility with respect to
and is altruistic towards K:
%TUP: UP(CP'U')'
toGtandparents (especially grandmothers) are the main source of childcare in
(3.1)
consumption, Co,
(3.2)
developing countries.
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The budget constraint is given by:
Ie 
- 
CE : Cp, (3.3)
where 1, denotes donor income and CE denotes childcare expenditures.
P is a utility maximizer and wants his/her children to be taken care of at the lowest
cost. The parent P is facing a choice between paying for childcare or transferring money,
?, to his/her sick parent G to get him/her cured
The following predictions emerge:
a) if I/ > fl thett T:O;
b)ifI/<1/then0<?<CE;
Since females are usually more reliable childcare providers, the model predicts that a
deterioration in mother's health generates more transfers than a deterioration in father's
health.
Both altruism and exchange affect transfers from adult children to their parents. Both
models predict that transfers and health shocks are positively related. However, I argue
that the exchange motive predominates in developing countries.
3.3 Private Tlansfers and Health: A Neglected fssue
Although transfers between parents and children are known to be common in both developed
and developing countries, we do not know much about the connection between parents'
health and private transfers from children.
Private transfers in developed countries are usually from old to young. Becker (1974)
was the first to address the topic of inter/intra-family transfers. He shows that parents
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make transfers to their children because they care about their well-being. Most of the
papers in the literature have focused on the motives behind private transfers. Bernheim,
Shleifer and Summers (1985), Cox (1987) and Cox and Rank (1992) show that parents make
transfers to their children in exchange for services provided by children.
Using the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS), McGarry and Schoeni (1995) show
that financial transfers to elderly parents are negatively related to the (potential) recipient's
income. These results hold both for the incidence of transfers and for the amouut. Using
data from the U.S. Asset and Health Dynamics Survey (AHEAD), McGarry (1998) explores
the role of adult children in elderly care. She finds that the strongest predictor of receiving
care is the degree of need. Children, including non-coresident offspring, provide assistance
with housekeeping tasks, while coresident individuals (spouses, children and others) help
with personal care needs. Only 10 percent of the children spend time helping their parents
with housekeeping or personal care (8.5 percent of non-coresident children). Fewer than
2 percent of children are reported to have made cash transfers to their impaired parents.
McGarry argues that it is not the case that children who are unable to spend time helping
a parent compensate with financial assistance.
There are a number of reasons why the direction of private transfers tends to be from
young to old in less developed countries, the most important being that extensive social
security systems are usually absent, so that old age support is provided mostly by adult
children.lr The main questions that the literature on remittaxrces explores are the motives
behind transfers and the propensity of making a transfer. Lucas and Stark (1985) show that
families in Botswana who are at risk of losing cattle or who rely mainly on crops for their
llPrivate transfers in low-income countries are also called remittances, since it is mainly migra.nts from
rural to urban areas or abroad, who send money back to their relatives.
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subsistence are the ones who receive greater remittances during time of drought. Secondi
(1997) claims that child care is likely to be one of the main services that parents render to
adult children in exchange for money. Cox et al. (1998) considers altruistic and exchange
motives for private income transfers. The empirical results support the exchange hypothesis.
The authors also find that being unemployed in Peru raises the probability of transfer receipt
by more than 13 percentage points, while being ill in the last four weeks raises it by over
five percentage points. De la Briere et al. (2002) test whether remittances are motivated by
an insurance contract taken by parents with their migrant children or by an investment by
migrants in potential bequests. They find that the insurance function is mainly fulfilled by
female migrants to the U.S. Only when a male is the sole migrant in his household does he
play the role of insurer. Investment, by contrast, is pursued by both males and females, but
only among those migrating to the U.S. Cameron and Cobb-Clark (2002) jointly estimate
the determinants of financial transfers from children and elderly Iabor supply. They find
that many Indonesians continue to work well into old age and there is little evidence that
financial transfers are a substitute for the income generated by elderly parents'own labor
supply. Gubert (2002) asks if remittances received by a household are higher during times
of crisis. Using household survey data from the Kayes area (western Mali) she finds support
for the view that insurance is an important motivation fcr remiitances. Diaz and Echevarria
(2002) use a new definition of altruism to explain inter vivos transfers: individuals worry
about related individuals only if their relatives' consumption falls below a certain level.
Several papers in the literature show that children in developing countries play impor-
tant role for the well-being of their elderly parents. Lillard and Willis (1997), using data
on time and money transfers between generations in Malaysia (where there is neither So-
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cial Security nor Medicare), find evidence supporting the hypotheses that children are an
important source of old age security and that old age security is, in part, children's re-
payment for parental investments in their education. This repayment is partly a function
of the children's incomes and, in the case of women, a function of their spouses incomes'.
They also find evidence supporting the hypotheses that parents and children engage in the
exchange of money for help with errands, chores, etc. Schrieder and Knerr (2000), using
data from Cameroon, find that migration with remittance strategies fails as a social security
mechanism when the potential remitter does not expect any sizable inheritance.
Although there is ample evidence that transfers respond to shocks, we know little about
the relationship between health shocks and transfers in a developing-country context. Em-
pirical evidence is scarce because of limited data on recipients health status. The literature
on developing countries focuses exclusively on transfers from migrants, but in Mexico, for
example, the share of domestic transfers in family income is as big as the share of remit-
tances.
3.4 The Institutional Context Matters
Institutional mechanisms for managing risk in Mexico are imperfect and administratively
complex. Palloni, Soldo and Wong (2002) characterize the institutional context in Mexico
as t'a fragile institutional environment vacuum, one where the bulk of sources and proce-
dures to guarantee minimum levels of social and economic support for the elderly are being
reformulated, reformed, and in some cases, eliminated."
The Mexican health care system consists of several disjointed subsystems. The first one
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is employment-based and is composed of a number of social security institutes that provide
insurance for the formally employed and their families (almost fifty million beneficiaries).
By far the largest of these is the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS).l2 It covers only
people who have jobs at private firms. The Institute for Social Security and Services for the
state workers (ISSSTE) covers only people that work for the state. These two institutions
are the main sources of pension income and health benefits in Mexico.l3 There are also
parallel social security institutions such as the Armed Forces Social Security, the Mexican
Oil Workers Social Security and other health services for state and federal government
employees. These institutions provide more generous benefits than IMSS and ISSSTE, but
cover very few people. The second subsystem consists of governmental services headed by
the Ministry of Health and limited services from nongovernmental organizations for the
uninsured population (estimated at around forty--eight million). The third subsystem is
the private sector that is almost entirely financed out of pocket and covers fewer than two
million enrollees. Irrespective of their economic status, people seem to prefer private health
cafe.
In Mexico as in other developing countries private expenditure is the main source of
expenditure in the health sector and most of that is direct out of pocket medical expen-
diture.la Barraza-Llorens, Bertozzi, Gcttzalez--Pier and Gutierrez (2002) present evidence
that between two and three million (of a total of twenty-two million) households spend
12The IMSS has the following welfa.re objectives: to provide workers vrrith social security benefits, including
coverage against various health risks; to provide financial securif for retirement; to protect against financial
losses associated with disability and death.
l3sixty and twenty percent, respectively of the people who report pension income receive pensions from
these institutions. Source: Author's calculations using MHAS.
laTotal Health Expenditure per capita is 236 US dolla,rs, Private Health Expenditure per capita is 164 US
dollars, and out ofpocket expenditure a,s percent ofprivate expenditure is 92.1 percent. Source: The World
Bank 2001, 2002 World, Deuelopment Indicators, WHO World Health Report, 2001.
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more than a third on their income on health care each year.
In summary more than half of all Mexicans remain uncovered by any explicit form of
health insurance, and most pay for health care out of pocket. What is the role of family
support mechanisms? In particular, do private transfers respond to health shocks?
3.5 Private Tlansfers and Health in Mexico: Basic Patterns
The newly available Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHAS) 2001 is an excellent data
source for exploring the relationship between transfers and health status because the MHAS
includes a wide variety of measures of health (including childhood circumstances), family
structure and transfers, migration history of respondents and kin, sources of income and
wealth and work history. This is the first data set for Mexico (and to my knowledge for
any developing country) that has such detailed information on the current health status of
respondents. In addition, each respondent is asked socioeconomic questions about his/her
children and the amount of money transfers received from and given to his/her children. Net
worth data was also gathered for the fi,rst time.ls The MHAS is a nationally representative
study of some 13 million Mexicans born prior to 1951.16 In addition, households in the six
states which send 40 percent of all Mexican migrants to the U.S. were oversampled at a rate
slightly less than 2:1.17 The data set contains information on 9,719 individuals and5,467
lslndividuals unable or unwilling to provide an exact amount in response to questions measuring income
and assets were asked a series of unfolding bracket questions. Wong and Espinoza (2003) impute the
non-response on amounts----either complete non-response or when information was provided by the bracket
questions in order to calculate income and assets by major categories, and to provide total income and total
net worth estimates. I use the imputed data provided by Wong and Espinoza.
16The sample for MHAS was selected from residents of both rural a.nd urban areas, from the National
Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, ENE), carried out by the Mexican Statistical Bureau(Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informritica, INEGI) in Mexico. The ENE survey covers
both urban and rural areas in all 32 states ofMexico. Households with at least one resident 50 or older were
eligible to be part of the MHAS sample.
17I control for selection by including a state dummy in my empirical work.
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spouses.
I link respondents' information with those they provide for their own children and carry
out my empirical work on a family level. I drop families with no children (about 640
families). I also drop the people who report that they are married, but the data on their
spouse is missing (119 cases) or who reported that they are not married, but have valid
data on their spouses (73 cases). In addition, I drop the respondents and their spouses
who have never seen a doctor or medical personnel (209 males out of 6167 and 152 females
out of 8225), since they have missing data on medical conditions.l8 My remaining sample
consists of 8833 families. The parents in my sample are relatively old: the mean mother's
age is 59 and the mean father's age is 62. Table 3.1 shows that the MHAS families have six
children on average, thirty-two percent of which reside at home, forty-four percent reside
in the same city, thirteen percent reside in another city in Mexico and nine percent live in
the U.S. or other countries.l9
The key variable in my analysis is the health status of respondents (the mother and the
father, respectively). The MHAS asks respondents if their doctor has ever told them that
they have a particular disease (medical condition). I want to examine what is the effect of
the severity of health problem on transfers, i.e. is it possible that those who have more severe
health problems also recei'.e more transfers. As in Smith (1999), I define severe medical
conditions to be cancer, heart attack, stroke or respiratory problems, and mild medical
l8only 3.38 percent of all males and 1.85 percent of all females in the survey have never been to a
doctor. One possible criticism is that by dropping the parents who have never been to a doctor (i.e.e,
their health status is unobserved), I might produce biased estimates. Although the assumption that
E(elParentsVealth,ParentsSE,ChildrensE) :0 is valid in the population, the health status is doing
the selection into the sample:
E(elin the sample)Pr(in the sample) a E(elout of the sample)Pr(out of the sample).
My results are conditional on having been to a doctor.
lsHowever, the majority of migrants live in the U.S.: only 2.3 percent of the children reside in other
countries.
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conditions to be high blood pressure or hypertension, diabetes, arthritis or rheumatism.
Fifty-nine (forty-five) percent of the mothers (fathers) suffer from a mild health problem
and thirteen (twelve) percent respectively from a severe health problem (Table 3.1).
Private transfers from children represent almost 22 percent of respondents' total family
income.20 Thirty--six percent of the parents in my sample received financial help from
children.2l The literature on developing countries focuses exclusively on transfers from
migrants and justifies that by the important distinction between migrant transfers and other
transfers: one of the reasons being that the remittances dominate domestic transfers both
in magnitude and in prevalence. But in Mexico, remittances and domestic transfers have
equal shares in the total income of families with migrants and children residing in Mexico.22
Almost all of the families who have at least one migrant child received remittances (Table
3.1).
As hypothesizedirr Section 3.2, transfers from children increase with a decrease in par-
ents' health status. Table 3.2 compares the amount of transfers given to a family if either
the mother or the father have a mild or severe health problem.23 In almost all of the cases
the amount of transfer is higher in the presence of a mild or severe medical condition. How-
ever, the differences in means are statistically different only for total and domestic transfers
made to families with a mildly sick mother and domestic transfers to families with a mildly
2oln this paper, I look at gross transfers, i.e. I ignore transfers that parents possibly make to their children.
Only 166 out of 50,326 children both received and gave transfers to parents.
2lThirty--€ight percent of the parents received help from children with household chores, errands, trans-
portation, etc. Twenty--one percent received both financial and non-financial help.
22Counting only strictly positive transfers.
23I aggregate transfers from all children in a given family and divide them into three groups: transfers
trom allihildren regardless of their residency, transfers from children residing in Mexico (including those
living with their parents) and transfers (remittances) from migrants to U.S. or other countries.
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sick father.za
3.6 Does Parental Health Matter for Transfers from Chil-
dren? A Multivariate Approach
As shown in the previous section, there is a basic relationship between parental health and
transfers from children. However, transfers are likely to be driven by other factors as well.
For example, a childts socioeconomic status could determine if and how much money is sent
to parents. Also I expect that parents from the lower end of the income distribution are
more likely to rely ou financial help from their children. In this section I use a multivariate
approach to estimate the determinants of transfers from children.
3.6.1- What is Parents' Propensity to Receive Financial Tlansfers from
Children?
First I study the causal effects of a narrow definition of parental health status on the
probability of receiving financial transfers from children. This problem is described by the
following latent variable model:
(3.4)f; 
- 
alPHf * azPSEf * asCSEf * a+Sf * *eyt
where 7y is 1 if family / received transfers from children in the last two years prior to the
interview andTy is 0 otherwise, PHy is a dummy variable that equals one if at least one
of the parents has reported at least one chronic condition and zero otherwise, PSE1 is a
2aTwo-tailed test was employed.
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vector of parentst socioeconomic variables, CSET is a vector of childrents socioeconomic
characteristics, S; is a state dummy, which is one if the family's state of residence is among
the six with highest out-migration to the U.S. in 1990-95 (Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco,
Michoac6n, Nayarit, Zacatecas) and zero otherwise, and e; is the error term, ey 
- 
N(0, o2)'
I use the same control variables as in McGarry and Schoeni (1995). However, since they
work with a sample of respondent-child pairs and I work with a sample of families, I control
for the percent of children in the family that have a given socioeconomic characteristic.2s
As a proxy for children's income, I use the percentage of children working in Mexico and in
the U.S., the percentage of children in their prime earning age (assumed to be greater than
23 years of age), percentage of children with more than 12 years of education, percentage
of female children and percentage of married children.
My key identifying assumption is that parents' health status is exogenous. The parental
health status questions ask whether the respondent ever had specific medical conditions.
While parents' health status in time t will depend on transfers, the transfer measure in the
data reflects the transfers made over the two years prior the interview.
Table 3.3b presents the marginal efiects from the probit estimation.26 For family couples
and single mothers poor health status is positively correlated with the incidence of transfers
from children. On the contrary, the father's health status does not matter for transfers. The
older and the poorer the parents, the higher are the transfers.27 Not surprisingly, families
with a higher percentage of children residing abroad are more likely to receive transfers
than families with children residing in Mexico.
25Most of the families have more than one child.
26The marginal effects a.re evaluated at the means of the independent variable throughout the paper.
27u"ittg per-capita resources instead of net worth does not change the results.
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The single equation model I presented above treats the health status of the parents as
exogenous. One can argue that parents who received financial support from their children
might be healthier than those who did not. If transfers positively affect health, the esti-
mation of the impact of health on transfers will be biased. In the following paragraph I
address the potential endogeneity of the health status.
I instrument the health status of the parents with their health status as children. Using
MHAS data on the parents, Palloni, Soldo and Wong (2002) show that there is an association
between early childhood conditions and current prevalence of obesity and diabetes. I extend
their analysis and show that early childhood health also has a predictive power for cancer,
heart attack, stroke, respiratory problems, high blood pressure or hypertension, and arthritis
(see Appendix 3.3). As an instrumental variable (IV), I use a binary variable indicating
whether at least one of the parents experienced severe health problems during childhood
and 0 otherwise. The severe health problems during childhood variable is a valid instrument
since it is not correlated with the unobservables in the transfers equation (Eq. (3.4)) and
is correlated with the parental health status during adulthood.28 The model is:
ri
PH}
alPHy * azPSEt * asCSEf * aaSy * ey
&EPH1 * PzPSEf * lscSEf * aaSy * qf ,, (3.5)
where PHy is the binary variable from the previous equation, EPH1 is the instrumental
variable, and (ey,4y) is independent of. EPH1 and is distributed as bivariate normal with
28However, this instrument might be a weak instrument. Palloni, Soldo and Wong (2002) say that: "The
multivariate analysis suggests that early childhood health may have an effect in late life, even though the
mechanisms involved are hypothetical and cannot be confirmed with our data. But although the estimated
efiects on obesity and diabetes are fairly high (relative risks are of the order of L.22; see Table 6), the fraction
experiencing bad health early in childhood is relatively low (about 11 percent ofrespondents)."
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mean zero and unit variance.
Estimating the above model is not trivial because both dependent variables are dichoto.
mous. Appendix 3.2 explains the potential problems with the estimation of probit models
with binary endogenous variables and demonstrates that the likelihood function of this
model is a bivariate probit.
The results from the bivariate probit estimation are presented in Table 3.4a. Testing if
the correlation, p, between the errors in the two equations is zero provides a simple test for
endogeneity. I cannot reject the hypothesis that p: 0 in all three cases (family couples,
single mothers and single fathers). I find that instrumenting for the health status does
not alter the qualitative results in the case of family couples: the estimated propensity of
receiving a transfer is positive and significant. For the case of single mothers instrumenting
changes the coefficient of health from marginally positive to not statistically different f-rom
zero. The case of single fathers should be interpreted with caution since the estimate of p
is one.29 Poor health status in this case is associated with decrease in transfers. It turns
out that the health status of single fathers is correlated with their own parents' longevity. I
define the latter as the age when parents died or the current age, if they are still alive. Using
own parents' longevity as an alternative instrument avoids the computational problems since
the estimated p is close to zero (although the hypothesis that P: 0 is rejected).
I also compare the marginal effect of parental health on the probability of transfer in
the case that treats the parental health status as endogenous with the one that treats it as
e*ogenous.so I find that in the endogenous case the marginal effect is higher in comparison
2sSee Appendix 3.2.
3octeene (1998) derives the formula for the marginal effects of the biva.riate model. The standard error
of the marginal effect is computed using the delta method.
111
with the exogenous case (Table 3.4b). Therefore, my finding that there is a positive and
significant relationship between parental health status and transfers from children remains
valid even afber controlling for endogeneity.
3.6.2 Are Parents with Severe Health Problems more Likely to Receive
Tbansfers than Parents with Mild Health Problems?
In this section I differentiate between mild and severe health conditions as well as between
mother's and father's health when exploring the health-transfers relationship. I estimate
the following probit model
r;
asPSEy * aaCSEf * azSy * €y, (3.6)
where 7; is 1 if family / received transfers from children in the last two years prior the
interview and ?y is 0 otherwise; MHPMy (MHPFf) is a dummy variable which equals one
if the mother (father) has a mild health problem and zero otherwise; S H P M f (^9HPF1) is a
dummy variable which equals one if the mother (father) has a severe health problem and zero
otherwise; PSE1 are parental socioeconomic variables, CSEr are children's socioeconomic
variables, ,Sy is a state dummy and e1 is the error term, e; 
- 
N(0, o2).
Again I assume that parents' health status is exogenous. To instrument for the four
binary endogenous health variables I need four instruments but I only have two. In the
previous section I showed that ignoring endogeneity of the health status does not change
the significance of the coefficients and even slightly increases their magnitude. While this
LL2
does not insure that controlling for endogeneity will not change the results once I change
the specifications to account for mothers' and fathers' health separately, I proceed under
the maintained assumption that these measures of health status are also exogenous.
Column 1 of Table 3.5 presents the marginal effects for the probit model for married
couples. I find that children give money to the family if the mother has mild or severe
health problem or if the father has mild health problem. A mother with a severe health
problem is twice as likely to receive transfers than a mother with a mild health problem.
The importance of the presence of a severe health problem is consistent with the theory that
grandmothers in developing countries have two important roles: first, they provide childcare
and second, they are primary caregivers to their husbands.3l As expected, the older and the
poorer the parents are, the higher is the probability of a transfer from children. An increase
in the percentage of children that are working or looking for work in the U.S. increases the
propensity of transfers.32 The number of married children is negatively correlated with the
amount of transfers.
The case of single mothers does not differ much from the case of married couples,
except that a severe medical condition has no impact on transfers. A father's age is the
only significant factor affecting the amount of transfers for single fathers.
3tusittg U.S. data Lakdawalla and Philipson (1999) find that spouses are willing and able to care for their
frail mates. f irey also find that the presence of a spouse decreases the qrobability of nursing home entrance
dramatically for'all except those individuals with several mental disabilities or children who live very close
to nome.
32I am making the assumption that all children's variables axe exogenous to transfers.
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3.6.3 Do Parents with Severe Health Conditions Receive More TYansfers
than Parents with Mild Health Conditions?
In this section I examine whether the severity of parents' health conditions influences the
amount of transfers they receive from their children. The case of one child is straightforward,
but the case of two or more children is more complicated since the transfer amount of one
child may depend on the transfers that his/her siblings made. I assume that the transfers
of each child are influenced in the same way by the regressors. Lets first consider the case
of two siblings. The transfer Ti of. child i in family / is given by:
(3.7)Ti-a1Ti*azDt+0Xf*€t,
where Q is the transfer that'i/s sibling, j, made, Diis a vector of dummy variables, indi-
cating whether or not child i has certain socioeconomic characteristics, X; is a vector of
family characteristics and e; is the error term. In the same way the transfer Q of child j in
family / is given by:
Combining the above equations
- 
alTi * azDj + CXf * et.
yields:
Tj (3.8)
(3.e)Tr +ft2 (1 
-CI1)\ 2 / '1-,,1 -r+M@t+ei)
Note that 'ot't t" the average amount of transfers over all children, and since Da and Di
are dummy variables, tih" 'olrot represents the percentage of children that have a certain
socioeconomic characteristic. This result can be generalized for N siblings. Therefore the
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ldependent variable, ?y, is the average amount of transfers over all children in family /. Since
some families did not receive any transfers, the dependent variable is both discrete (zero
transfers) and continuous (positive transfers). In order to address the censoring problem I
apply Tobit analysis, estimating the following model:
T;
]sPSEf + p6CSE1 + 0zSr * €1t
where Tt : Ti lt f; > 0 and Tt : O if ry < 0, where T7 is the observed amount of
transfers sent by the children in /th family and $ is the corresponding latent variable. The
independent variables are the same a,s in Eq. (3.6) and e;, is the error term, ef 
- 
N(0,o2).
Again, since controlling for endogeneity of health status did not change the results in
the probit estimation, I carry the Tobit analysis under the assumption that parental health
status is exogenous.
The marginal effect of a mother's severe health condition is 35.4 thousand pesos, which
is almost twice the marginal effect of a mild health condition. An increase in the percentage
of children that are working or looking for work in the U.S. increases the amount of transfers
by 3.4 thousand pesos or 3.2 thousand pesos, respectively. In comparison, the effect of the
percentage of children working or looking for work in Mexico on transfers is three times
smaller. The percentage of married children is negatively correlated with the amount of
transfers.
The case of single mothers does not differ very much from the case of married couples,
except that a severe medical condition has no impact on transfers. A father's age is the
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(3.10)
only significant factor affecting the amount of transfers for single fathers.
I find that children give money to the family if the mother is sick, but not if the father
is sick. These results are robust across different specifications.33
3.6.4 Why do Sick Grandmothers Receive more Ttansfers then Sick Grand-
fathers?
In this section I test the grandmother hypothesis, described in Section 3.2. If childcare
provision underlies my finding about the disparity of grandmothers' and grandfathers' health
status with respect to transfers, I expect to find that the number of grandchildren (K) is
positively and significantly associated with the amount of transfers parents (P) provide to
grandparents (G).
My findings are in support of the "grandmothers hypothesis." The results from the
Tobit estimation are presented in Tables 3.7a and 3.7b. The number of grandchildren
in the extended family (Table 3.7a) is predictive for transfers in all three cases: family
couples, single mothers and single fathers.3a The number of grandchildren living in the
same household as their grandparents (Table 3.7b) is positive and significant only for the
case of married couples.3s As in the previous specifications the mother's severe health
conditions has a positive effect on transfers for the case of married couples. The health
status of fathers has no impact on transfers either in the case of family couples or in the
case of single fathers. As before in the case of single mothers a mild health condition is
33Additional results a.re available upon request.
saThe households with no grandchildren in the extended family (about 18 percent ofall households in my
sample) are included in the analysis.
35I argue that the number of grandchildren living in the same household as their grandpa.rents is unlikely
to be coirelated with grandparents hea.lth status, since in developing countries two or three generations ofben
live under the same roof.
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positively correlated with transfers from children.36
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper, I use information from the MHAS to study the relationship between transfers
from children and the health status of their parents. I find that transfers from children re.
spond to parental health status. To answer the question why would children care about the
health of their parents I develop a theoretical framework that considers three generations:
grandparents, parents and grandchildren. I assume that parents care about children, and
that grandparents care about grandchildren. Therefore, children will care for their parents
because they are expecting them to provide childcare to their own children. Since grand-
mothers provide more care to young children than grandfathers, then it matters whether
the elderly parent in question is male rather than female. It follows that there would be
more of a premium for helping elderly women, which is what I find in my empirical work:
the mother's mild or severe health problems are positively correlated with transfers, but in
most of the specifications the father's health status has no impact on transfers.
This finding has an important public policy implication. If indeed children are making
transfers to elicit child care from parents, then an increase in public transfers would not
lead to crowding out of private transfers.
How is familial elderly care arra,nged in country with high migration rate like Mexico?
Do private transfers from migrants or from kids residing in Mexico respond to health shocks?
I find that the percentage of children who are working in the U.S. is associated with greater
36Dividing the sample in two pa,rts depending on the presence of grandchildren in the extended family
produces similar results.
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financial help to parents in comparison to the percentage of children who are working
in Mexico. This suggests that migration helps families to take care of their frail elderly
members, if we accept that those who migrate to the U.S. do so because of better financial
opportunities.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics, Family Level Data
Total Net Wort
Net Household Incomeb
Mother has Mild Health Problem
Father has Mild Health Problem
Mother has Severe Health Problem
Father has Severe Health Problem
Total Number of Children
8818
8818
5808
7813
5806
7813
8818
350027
64036
0.43
0.58
0.11
o.L2
- 
Pnb..)o
655727
886872
0.50
0.49
0.31
0.32
2.94
Number of Children
Live in the Same Home
Live in the Same City
Live in Other City in Mexico
Live in U.S. or other countries
8818
8818
8818
8818
L.48
2.60
0.79
0.55
1.47
2.34
1.48
t.27
Percent of Children
Live in the Same Home
Live in the Same City
Live in Other City in Mexico
Live in U.S. or other Countries
8818
8818
8818
8818
32.04 31.58
44.54 32.53
L2.92 22.43
8.42 18.51
Percent of Children Making Positive Thansfers 8818 0.34 0.47
Percent of Children Making Transfers that
Live in the Same Home
Live in the Same City
Live in Other City in Mexico
Live in U.S. or other Countries
8818
8818
8818
8818
0.L2
0.16
0.07
0.09
0.33
0.37
0.26
0.28
Amount of Total Tlansfersc
Amount of Tbansfers from Home
Amount of Tlansfers from the Same City
Arnount of Tlansfers Other City in Mexico
Amount of Tbansfers U.S. or other Countries
8818
8818
8818
8818
8818
22259
4076
9155
4062
4934
144243
38920
100408
47678
54L52
Share of Tlansfers in Total Family Income
Total Tbansfers
Tlansfers from Home
Tlansfers from the Same City
Tlansfers Other City in Mexico
Tlansfers U.S. or other Countries
7995
5816
6168
28L9
1836
0.22
0.09
0.11
0.09
0.17
0.47
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.49
Parents Received Financial Help from Children 8833 0.36 0.48
Parents Received Help from Children with Household Chores,
8818
Errands, Tbansportation, etc.
0.38
0.49
0.48
0.50Parents Cor ing with Children 8778
Source: Authors calculations using the Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHAS). Weighted statistics.
@All amounts are in pesos. (1 USD=9 pesos)
bTotal household income minus transfers.
clncluding zero transfers.
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Table 3.2: The Relationship between Transfers and Health
Tlansfers Remittances
Mother has Mild Health Problem No rnean
No
N,)0b
Yes mean
N
N,)0
t5732
3135
1028
28113
4678
1938
LL242
3110
888
22290
4628
1718
20769
667
259
22505
LLL4
426
Ho : diff"-: 0 t
P>ltl
-3.7952
0.0002
-3.6716
0.0002
-0.8928
0.3488
Mother has Severe Health Problem No mean
N
N,)0
Yes mean
N
N,)0
22280
6772
253r
27944
LO4I
435
1_7085
6702
22t9
22045
1036
387
22452
1508
586
18684
273
99
Ho : diff,-,: 0 t
P>lrl
-1.3909
0.1643
-I.24L7
0.2L44
-o.2429
0.8081
Father has Mild Health Problem No rnean
N
N,)0
Yes rnean
N
N,)0
9644
3218
900
15995
2590
860
602L
3169
736
L2224
2552
747
L4409
727
24L
16379
595
208
Ho:diff^,:0 t
P>ltl
-1.5530
o.L204
-2.0139 0.9978
0.0441 0.3185
Father has Severe Health Problem No rnean
N
N,)0
Yes rnean
N
N,>0
LzOL7
5094
1510
15393
712
249
8L72
502r
1266
13155
698
217
15967
LT43
382
8962
L78
66
Ho : diff^,- 0 t
P>ltl
-1.3186
0.1874
-1.0657
0.2866
-0.7906
0.4293
Source: Authors calculations using the Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHAS). Weighted statistics.
@Number of families that could potentially receive transfers.
bNumber of families that have received positive transfers.
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Table 3.3a: Probit Estimation of the Effect of Health on Transfers
Parents in Poor Health
Mother's Age
Father's Age
Ivlother has Medical Insurarrce
Father has Medical Insurance
Lowest Net Worth Quartile
Second Net Worth Quartile
Third Net Worth Quartile
Percentage of Children Living at Home
Percentage of Children, Domestic Migrants
Percentage of Children, International Migrants
Percentage of Children, ) L2 Years of Education
Percentage of Children in Prime Earning Age
Percentage of Married Male Children
Percentage of Married Female Children
Percentage of Single Female Children
Dummy for a High-Migration State
Constant
Observations
Married Couples
0.110
(0.046)**
0.008
(o.oo3) * **
0.007
(o.oo3) **
0.132
(0.075)*
-0.103
(0.074)
0.178
(0.059)***
0.148
(0.053)***
0.146
(0.051)***
-0.001
(o.oo1)
0.002
(0.001)
0.009
(o.oo1)***
-0.002
(o.oo1)***
0.004
(o.oo1)***
-0.002
(0.001) x
-0.003
(o.oo1)**
-0.001
(0.001)
0.045
Q.042)
-L.772
(0.178)***
5149
Single Mothers
0.L32
(0.053)*
0.005
(0.003)
0.092
(0.053)
0.160
(0.072) *
0.r47
(0.076)
0.167
(0.076) *
-0.003
(o.oo1)*
0.002
(o.oo 1) *
0.008
(o.oo2)**
-0.000
(o.oo1)
0.003
(o.oo1) **
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.004
(o.oo1)**
-0.004
(o.oo2) *
-0.o77
(0.056)
-0.569
(0.209)**
2732
Single Fathers
0.026
(0.101)
0.015
(o.oo5)**
-0.023
(0.102)
0.009
(0.146)
0.154
(0.151)
0.153
(0.157)
0.003
(o.oo2)
0.002
(0.002)
0.006
(o.oo2) *
-0.000
(o.oo2)
0.003
(o.oo2)
0.001
(o.oo3)
0.001
(0.003)
-0.001
(o.oo3)
0.115
(0.112)
-2.2r9
(0.378)**
8L2
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at LOTo; ** significant at SYo; *** significant at I7o
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Table 3.3b: Marginal Effects of Health on Transfers (Probit Estimation)
Parents in Poor Health
Mother's Age
Father's Age
Mother has Medical Insurance
Father has Medical Insurance
Lowest Net Worth Quartile
Second Net Worth Quartile
Third Net Worth Quartile
Percentage of Children Living at Home
Percentage of Children, Domestic Migrants
Percentage of Children, International Migrants
Percentage of Children, ) 12 Years of Education
Percentage of Children in Prime Earning Age
Percentage of Married Male Children
Percentage of Married Female Children
Percentage of Single Female Children
Dummy for a High-Migration State
Observations
Married Couples
0.038
(0.016)*x
0.003
(o.oo1)***
0.003
(o.oo1)**
0.046
(0.026)x
-0.036
(0.026)
0.064
(0.022)***
0.052
(0.019)***
0.052
(0.018)***
-0.000
(o.ooo)
0.000
(o.ooo)
0.003
(o.ooo)*x*
-0.001
(o.ooo)***
0.002
(o.ooo)***
-0.001
(o.ooo) *
-0.001
(o.ooo)**
-0.000
(o.ooo)
0.016
(0.015)
5L49
Single N4others
0.053
(0.021)*
0.002
(o.oo1)
0.037
(0.021)
0.064
(o.o2e) *
0.058
(o.03o)
0.066
(o.o30) *
-0.001
(o.ooo) x
0.001
(o.ooo) *
0.003
(o.oo1)**
-0.000
(o.ooo)
0.001
(o.ooo) * *
-0.001
(o.ooo)
-0.001
(o.ooo)**
-0.001
(o.oo 1) x
-0.031
(0.022)
2732
Single Fathers
0.008
(0.031 )
0.005
(o.oo2)**
-0.007
(0.032)
0.003
(0.045)
0.049
(o.o4e)
0.049
(0.052)
0.001
(o.oo1)
0.001
(0.001)
0.002
(o.oo 1)*
-0.000
(o.ooo)
0.001
(o.ooo)
0.000
(o.oo1)
0.000
(o.oo1)
-0.000
(o.oo1)
0.037
(0.036)
8L2
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at I07o; ** significant at 57o; *** significant at lTo
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Table 3.4a: Bivariate Probit Estimation of the Effect of Health on Tlansfers
Parents in Poor Health
Mother in Poor Health in
Childhood
Father in Poor Health in
Childhood
Mother's Age
Father's Age
Mother has Medical Insurance
Father has Medicallnsurance
Lowest Net Worth Quartile
Second Net Worth Quartile
Third Net Worth Quartile
Percentage of Children
Living at Home
Percentage of Children,
Domestic Migrants
Percentage of Children,
International Migrants
Percentage of Children,
> L2 Years of Education
Percentage of Children in
Prime Earning Age
Percentage of Married MaIe
Children
Percentage of Married Female
Children
Percentage of Single Female
Children
Dummy for a High-Migration
State
Constant
Single Mothers
0.258
(0.072)**
0.010 0.005(o.oo3)** (o.oo3)
0.210 0.134(0.058)** (0.066)*
0.057 0.161(o.o7e) (0.074)*
-0.051 0.119(0.082) (0.082)
0.038 0.148(0.0s2) (0.078)
-0.002 -0.003(o.oo1) (o.oo1)**
-0.002 0.001(o.oo1) (o.oo1)
-0.000 0.007(o.oo2) (o.oo2)**
-0.002 -0.001(o.oo1)* (o.oo1)
0.001 0.003(o.oo1) (o.oo1)**
0.002 -0.002(o.oo1) (o.oo2)
0.001 -0.003(o.oo1) (o.oo2)*
-0.000 -0.004(o.oo2) (o.oo2 ) *
-0.03 -0.085(0.061) (0.057)
-0.384 -0.088(0.228) (0.357)
Father in Transfers
Poor Health
Single Fathers
-0.612
(0.637)
0.163 -1.508(0.077)* (0.067)**
0.010 0.4L2(o.oo5)* (o.oo5)**
0.267 0.235(0.097)** (0.089)**
-0.061 -0.057(0.130) (0.122)
-0.24r -0.092(0.138) (0.12e)
-0.238 -0.110(0.14e) (0.136)
Parents in
Poor Health
Married
o.249
(0.062)***
0.2L5
(0.059)***
0.008
(o.oo3)**
0.014
(o.oo4)***
0.L62
(0.082)*x
0.190
(0.081)**
0.L62
(0.067)**
0.078
(0.058)
0.156
(0.057)***
-0.000
(o.oo1)
-0.000
(o.oo1)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.000
(o.oo1)
0.001
(o.oo1)
0.002
(0.001)
0.003
(o.oo1)**
0.000
(o.oo1)
-0.073
(0.047)
-1.095
(0.207)***
Tlansfers
Couples
0.858
(0.404)* *
Mother in
Poor Health
Tbansfers
0.005
(o.oo3)
0.006
(o.oo4)
0.110
(0.085)
-0.161
(0.079)**
0.L42
(0.069)**
0.1 13
(o.o5e) *
0.100
(o.060) *
- 0.000
(o.oo1)
0.001
(0.001)
0.008
(o.oo1)***
-0.002
(o.oo1)***c
0.004
(o.oo1)***
-0.003
(o.oo1)**
-0.003
(o.oo1)**
-0.002
(o.oo1)
0.061
(0.044)
-1.951
(0.198)***
0.002 0.005(o.oo2) (o.oo2)*
-0.000 -0.001,(o.oo1) (o.oo 1)
0.006 0.005(o.oo1)** (o.oo1)**
0.001 0.003(o.oo2) (o.oo2)
0.002
(o.oo2)
0.002
(o.oo2)
0.001
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.003)
-0.r45
(0.110)
0.002
(o.oo2)
0.002
(o.oo2)
0.003
(o.oo2)
0.000
(o.oo3)
-0.041
(0.100)
-1.246 -L.193(0.354)** (0.331)**
p
Test Ho:p:0
tX-
Prob > X2
Observations 4558
-0.466
2.381
0.r23
4558
0.437
0.994
0.331
250L
1.000
0.004
0.949
73r250L
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at I07o; ** significant at 5To; *** significant at I7o
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Table 3.4a Cont. : Bivariate Probit Estimation of the Effect of Health on Tbansfers
Father in Tlansfers
Poor Health
Single Fathers
Father in Poor Health
Fathers Parents Age
Fathers Age
Father has Medical Insurance
Lowest Net Worth Quartile
Second Net Worth Quartile
Third Net Worth Quartile
Percentage of Children Living at Home
Percentage of Children, Domestic Migrants
Percentage of Children, International Migrants
Percentage of Children,, ) L2 Years of Education
Percentage of Children in Prime Earning Age
Percentage of Married Male Children
Percentage of Married Female Children
Percentage of Single Female Children
Dummy for a High-Migration State
Constant
p
Test Ho : p:0
x2
Prob > X2
Observations
0.003
0.000
(o.ee6)
735
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at tO%; ** significant at 57o; *** significant at tTo
-0.004
(1.326)
0.006
(0.003)
0.013 0.013(0.005)* (o.ooe)
a.270 0.013(o.oee)** (0.176)
-0.093 -0.049(0.140) (0.161)
-0.256 0.108(0.146) (0.202)
-0.244 0.141(0.155) (0.203)
0.001 0.002(0.002) (o.oo2)
0.003 0.001(o.oo2) (o.oo3)
0.001 0.006(0.002) (o.oo2) *
-0.001 -0.001(o.oo2) (o.oo2)
0.005 0.002
(o.oo2) * * (o.oo3)
0.002 0.002(o.oo2) (o.oo3)
0.002 0.003(o.oo2) (o.oo3)
0.002 0.000(o.oo3) (o.oo3)
-0.041 0.139(0.111) (0.120)
- 1 .9 10 -2 .rrr(0.439)** (0.409)**
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Table 3.4b: Marginal Effects of the Effect of Health on Thansfers (Bivariate Probit
Estimation)
Married
Couples
Single
Mothers
Single
Fathers
Single
Fathers
Parents in Poor
Instrument: Health in
Childhood
Parents in Poor
Health in
Childhood
Parents in Poor
Health in
Childhood
Father's Parents
Age
Parents in Poor Health 0.311
Observations
(0.107)
4558
-0.330
(0.238)
250L
-0.775
(0.019)**
73r
-0.001
(0.407)
735
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at I07o; ** significant at 57o; *** significant at LVo
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Table 3.5: Marginal Effects of the Effect of Health on Tlansfers (Probit Estimation)
Mother has Mild Health Problem
Father has MiId Health Problem
Mother has Severe Health Problem
Father has Severe Health Problem
Mothers Age
Fathers Age
Mother has Medical Insurance
Father has lvledical Insurance
Lowest Net Worth Quartile
Second Net Worth Quartile
Third Net Worth Quartile
Percentage of Children Working in USA
Percentage of Children Working in Mexico
Percentage of Children Looking for Work in USA
Percentage of Children Looking for Work in Mexico
Percentage of Children Students in USA
Percentage of Children Students in Mexico
Percentage of Children House Work in Mexico
Percentage of Children, ) 12 Years of Education
Percentage of Children in Prime Earning Age
Percentage of Married Male Children
Percentage of Married Female Children
Percentage of Single Female Children
Dummy for a High-Migration State
Observations
Married Couples
0.025
(0.014) x
0.032
(0.014)**
0.042
(0.021)**
0.022
(0.021)
0.002
(o.oo1)**
0.003
(o.oo1)***
0.030
(0.026)
-0.031
(0.027)
0.060
(0.022)***
0.049
(o.o2o)**
0.045
(0.019)**
0.006
(o.oo1)***
0.003
(o.ooo)***
0.005
(0.001)***
0.002
(0.001)***
-0.000
(o.oo4)
-0.001
(o.oo1)
0.001
(o.oo1)
-0.001
(o.ooo)***
0.001
(o.ooo)**
-0.001
(o.ooo)***
-0.001
(o.ooo) **
-0.000
(o.oo0)
0.013
(0.015)
4925
Single Mothers
0.064
(0.021)**
-0.041
(a.027)
0.003
(o.oor)**
0.030
(0.021)
0.069
(o.02e)*
0.060
(o.o3o) *
0.062
(o.o3o)*
0.006
(o.oo1)**
0.003
(o.oo1)**
0.004
(o.oo2)*
0.003
(o.oo1)x*
0.006
(o.oo5)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(o.oo1)
-0.000
(o.ooo)
0.001
(o.ooo)*
-0.001
(o.ooo) x
-0.001
(o.ooo) *
-0.001
(o.oo1) *
-0.028
(0.022)
2732
Single Fathers
0.015
(0.031)
-0.022
(0.043)
0.005
(o.oo2)**
-0.012
(0.032)
0.005
(0.046)
0.057
(0.050)
0.059
(0.053)
0.003
(0.001)**
0.001
(o.oo1)
-0.004
(o.oo3)
0.000
(o.oo1)
-0.000
(o.oo2)
0.000
(o.oo1)
-0.000
(o.ooo)
0.001
(o.ooo)
-0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(o.oo1)
0.000
(0.001)
0.034
(0.036)
810
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 1O7o; ** significant at 57o; *** significant at LTo
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Table 3.6: Marginal Effects of Health on Transfers (Tobit Estimation)
Mother has Mild Health Problem
Father has Mild Health Problem
Mother has Severe Health Problem
Father has Severe Health Problem
Mothers Agu
Fathers Age
Mother has Medical Insurance
Father has Medical Insurance
Lowest Net Worth Quartile
Second Net Worth Quartile
Third Net Worth Quartile
Percentage of Children Working in USA
Percentage of Children Working in Mexico
Percentage of Children Looking for Work in USA
Percentage of Children Looking for Work in Mexico
Percentage of Children Students in USA
Percentage of Children Students in Mexico
Percentage of Children House Work in Mexico
Percentage of Children,, ) 12 Years of Education
Percentage of Children in Prime Earning Age
Percentage of Married Male Children
Percentage of Married Female Children
Percentage of Single Female Children
Dummy for a High-Migration State
Observations
Married Couples
17,195
(9,096)*
12,9L9
(8,901)
35,438
( 12,595)***
L2,2OO
(13,081)
1,311
(730)*
L,,252
(713)*
39,L92
(17,536)**
-26,300
(17,335)
25,003
(13,786)*
20,942
(L2,257)*
7,348
(11,823)
3,395
(418)***
1,884
(341)***
3,194
(807)***
L,L62
(407)***
-45L
(2,959)
-634
(425)
65
(5e6)
-580
(146)***
529
(202)***
-992
(248)***
-841
(280)***
-239
(27s)
9,389
(9,684)
-47L,996
(44,859)***
4925
Single Mothers
58,912
(18,361)**
-34,028
(24,,049)
3,068
(874)**
33,240
(L8,737)
II,677
(25,260)
L2,,573
(26,897)
10,456
(26,707)
3,934
(829)**
1,670
(663)*
3,929
(1,669)*
r,972
(770)*
L,78L
(4,,304)
-275
(e2o)
-228
(1,065)
203
(266)
310
(38e)
-97
(458)
-168
(504)
-398
(551)
-11,600
(r9,622)
-579,79L
(89,250)**
2732
Single Fathers
19,918
(23,628)
3,501
(33,513)
3,976
(1,195)**
-37,7L7
(24,L6r)
1,400
(34,356)
37,097
(35,6e6)
56,259
(36,835)
t,776
(7e5)x
t,zLO
(655)
-r,749
(2,232)
_19
(838)
L6,924
(19,517)
-356
(1,256)
288
(1,136)
236
(370)
5L4
(3e7)
-277
(636)
365
(6e8)
-296
(763)
2L,216
(26,r77)
-6L2,777
(106,867)**
811
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at I07o; ** significant at SYo; *** significant at LYo
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Table 3.7a: Marginal Effects
I'[umber of Grandchildren in
of the Effect of Health on Transfers, Controlling for the
the Extended Family (Tobit Estimation)
Married
Couples
16,538
(e,105)*
L4,760
(8,894)*
32,650
(12,591)***
9,757
(13,048)
r,624
(723)**
886
(713)
43,,379
(17,514)**
-27,,L74
(r7,298)
25,180
(13,810)*
20,673
(L2,250)*
7,744
(LL,794)
67
(24t)
382
(21e)*
r,773
(248)***
-406
(t44)***
1,055
(197;***
-753
(275)***
-954
(284)***
-43L
(272)
7,L56
(2,L47)x**
8,190
(9,712)
4925
Single Mothers Single
Fathers
Mother has Mild Health Problem
Father has Mild Health Problem
Mother has Severe Health Problem
Father has Severe Health Problem
Mothers Age
Fathers Age
Mother has Medical Insurance
Father has Medical Insurance
Lowest Net Worth Quartile
Second Net Worth Quartile
Third Net Worth Quartile
Percentage of Children Living at Home
Percentage of Children, Domestic Migrants
Percentage of Children, International Migrants
Percentage of Children, ) 12 Years of Education
Percentage of Children in Prime Earning Age
Percentage of Married Male Children
Percentage of Married Female Children
Percentage of Single Fbmale Children
Number of Grandchildren in the Extended Family
Dummy for a High-Migration State
Observations
54,964
(18,297)**
13,210
(23,421)
-39,191
(23,964)
6,128
(32,962)
3,537
(9oo)**
4,103
(1,196)**
29,524
(18,604)
-37,338
(23,896)
l-2,135 3,369(25,r7L) (33,966)
4,544 27,400(26,763) (35,091)
6,,929 43,139(26,584) (36,411)
-2ro 1,019(411) (4eo)*
628 L,O29(380) (444)*
2,217 1,004(4s4)** (524)
4A7 574(263) (367)
488 57L(374) (3e2)
-511 -254(482) (645)
-688 -276(504) (668)
-469 -670(544) (751)
20,342 10,831(3,891)** (5,102)*
-16,897 L4,546(19,554) (25,e85)
2732 811
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at IOTo; ** significant at 5To; *** significant at I7o
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Table 3.7b: Marginal Effects
Grandchildren, Living in the
of the Effect of Health on
Grandparents Household
Transfers, Number of
(Tobit Estimation)
Mother has Mild Health Problem
Father has Mild Health Problem
Mother has Severe Health Problem
Father has Severe Health Problem
Mothers Age
Fathers Age
Mother has Medical Insurance
Father has Medical Insurance
Lowest Net Worth Quartile
Second Net Worth Quartile
Third Net Worth Quartile
Percentage of Children Living at Home
Percentage of Children, Domestic Migrants
Percentage of Children, International Migrants
Percentage of Children, ) L2 Years of Education
Percentage of Children in Prime Earning Age
Percentage of Married Male Children
Percentage of Married Female Children
Percentage of Single Female Children
Numtrer of Grandchildren, L,iving in the Grandparents Household
Dummy for a High-Migration State
Observations
Married Single Single
Couples Mothers Fathers
L8,027 58,029(9,082)** (18,378)*x
14,878 L5,2L5(8,885)* (23,489)
32,696 -36,143(12,591)*** (24,022)
10,725 4,892(13,032) (33,261)
r,,528 2,469(72L)** (883)**
r,o22 3,592(7rr) (1,182)**
43,575 35,148(17,489)** (13,624)
-26,584 -31,948(L7,274) (23,808)
22,82L 9,768 2,476(13,784)* (25,285) (34,087)
20,338 L0,327 29,549(L2,235)* (26,862) (35,333)
7,,718 1L,602 48,904
( 11,730) (26,,684) (36,464)
-2L2 -7r7 956(242) (408) (4e4)
361 586 977
(2 1e) * (380) (444)*
r,776 2,20\ 944(247)*** (495)** (524)
-47A 153 369(1421*** (262) (363)
r,044 584 684(1e8)*** (376) (3s2)
-692 -93 23r(273)** (4s6) (633)
-861 -2r5 273(281;*** (507) (642)
-450 -365 -525(273)* (54e) (751)
9,041 -1,481 -10,319(4,,L37)** ( 7,51 1) (tO,24A)
L 1,073 -13,,420 18,855(9,661) (19,590) (25,964)
4925 2732 811
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at lOTo; ** significant at 5%o; *** significant at L%o
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Appendix 3. 1 : Altruistic Model of Private Transfers
I assume that children are altruistic towards their parents. If transfers are motivated by
altruism, then children will transfer funds to their sick parents.
The utility of the recipient I/ is assumed to depend on the level of health of the recipient,
H, and on his/her level of consumption, Cr,37
V-Vt(C,)+Vz(H). (A3.1.1)
I assume that Vl > O, V; > 0, Vl' < O, Vlt < O.
Let U denote the utilitv of the donor and assume that the donor is altruistic. Altruistic
behavior is modeled by allowing the donors to derive utility from the consumption level of
the recipients. The donor's utility function depends also on his/her own consumption, C4:
U 
- 
u(Ca) + pv,
where 0 is a positive parameter.
The budget constraints are given by:
(A3.1.2)
Ir*T:C, (A3.1.3)
and
Ia-T 
- 
Ca, (A3.1.4)
where 14, ,i : r, d, denote donor and recipient income and ? denotes the amount of transfers
from the donor to the recipient.s8 The donor is maximizing his utility V with respect to 7
37F'uture work witl explore the following health production function: H 
- 
Ho *
exogenous part of health, fr denote health inputs and p, the price of health inputs.
38I focus on gross transfers in this paper, but I plan to investigate the correlation
transfers in the future.
H ("), where I{o is the
between health and net
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Therefore the first order condition of the problem is:
AU AU ^AVfr : -d4+ P#;: o (,a'3'1'6)
How does the optimal level of transfers, 7*, respond to an exogenous reduction in If?
Intuitively a fall in 11 makes the potential recipient worse off and transfers are needed to
compensate him/her. In order to determine how the optimal level of transfers varies with
health status, recipient's and donor's income, I apply the implicit function theorem to the
fi rst--order condition:
and subject to his/her budget constraint:
max U 
- 
U (Ia 
- 
r) * CW(I, * r) + 7Vz(H).T
AUz--(H,7,, Ir,Ia)-0
OT
ar#
AH AT
(A3.1.5)
(A3.1.7)
(A3.1.8)
(A3.1.e)
if the recipient's
< 0. Therefore a
(A3.1.6) implies
where:
0z
AH
02u
0H )Ca
I assume that an altruistic donor will enjoy less his/own consumption
health deteriorates i... #fu > 0. Then since ffi < 0, :t follows that uoq
decrease in parents'health leads to an increase in transfers from children.
The purpose of this theoretical framework is to guide estimation. Eq.
the following reduced form:
T* : f (H, Ir, Ia),
where 7* is the optimal level of transfers.
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(A3.1.10)
F\rture work intends to refine the above model by introducing a second period. The
donor decides whether to make a transfer in the first period and his utility depends on the
recipient's probability of survival in the second period.
r37
Appendix 3.2: Probit with Binary Endogenous Explanatory
Variable
I consider the case where one of the explanatory variables is correlated with the error term
in the latent variable model:
a;
Ar
A; 
- 
ztSzt * zzSzz *'u2 : z5 * uz
az: 7ifY2*>0
where (ut,uz) is independent of z and distributed as bivariate normal with mean zero, has
unit variance and p 
- 
Corr(u1,u2). If p * O, then u1 and, u2 are correlated and probit
estimation of the first equation is inconsistent for 61 and a1 (Wooldridge (2002), page 477).
Rivers and Vuong (1988) provide a two-step approach for the case where the endogenous
variable is continuous. Iilowever, if the endogenous variable is binary, the two-step procedure
does not produce consistent estimators. Wooldridge (2002), page 478 provides the following
argument: t'For this two-step procedure to work, we would have to have:
P(Yt
But
P(n: L, 
") : E(a, : l, z) : E(Lla\ * qrYz + ullz)
and since the indicator function 1[.] is nonlinear, we cannot pass the expected value through."
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Maximum likelihood estimation is the correct approach. The joint density of (u1, u2) is:
dz(ur, rz)
To derive the likelihood function note that:
u?+ul-
2rourourlffi
2prtuzlT)l-1exp l_;L 1- p2
6z(ut, u2)dutduz
p(yr- 1 ,yz 
-- 
0) : !_:t' l:,u,dr(ur,u2)d,u1duz
P(ar- o ,uz:1)
J _z\c
l:",,1*cr)
l_:"'dr*o'l fz(ut, u2)dutduz
p(y, :0,u2 : q : [-"u' S-z$t dz(u1,u2)d.u1d.u2J-a J-a
Combining the four possible outcomes of (Ar,y2) and taking the log gives the log-likelihood
function for maximum likelihood analysis. The likelihood function corresponding to this set
of events is a bivariate probit.3g Note that if p : g the two error terms are independent and
o2 reduces to two separate standard normal distributions. Testing that y2 is exogenous is
done by simply testing Ho : p: 0. If p : 1 or p : 
-! the two error terms are essentially
the same. Wooldridge (2002), page 476 talks about convergence difficulties when 0 tends
to *1. One has to keep in mind that the b *u, difier from zero for two reasons. First, it
may reflect the actual correlation between the two errors. Second, the model may not be
3eEvans and Schwab (1995) use this approach.
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correctly specified. For example, if the true model is:
yi
Ut
y; 
-- 
ztdzr * zzSzz * Szzzz t u2 
-- 
z5 + uz
Uz
and z2 is omitted, then the error terms will be correlated, since u!1 
- 
u1
uz * Szzzz-
* a2z2 and u'2
L4A
Appendix 3.3: Palloni and Soldo (2002) replication, plus Mild and Severe Health Conditions
Female
Age 6074
Age 75
Urban
Illiterate
Primary Education
Parents in Poor Health in Childhood
Constant
Observations
Diabetes
0.153
(0.049)***
0.306
(0.051)**x
0.008
(0.084)
o.294
(0.054)*xx
-0.009
(o.o5e)
-0.44
(0.066)***
o.235
(o.061):F*rr
-2.06L
(0.063)*x*
13710
Hypertension
0.680
(0.038)**
0.395
(o.o4o) x *
0.448
(0.061)**
0.104
(o.o4o)**
-0.120
(0.045)**
-0.293
(0.048)**
o.344
(o.048) **
-L.L46
(0.047)**
13700
Cancer or
T\rmor
1.r29
(0.158)x*
-0.024
(0.13e)
-0.096
(0.228)
-0.017
(0.143)
0.347
(0.161)*
0.734
(0.150)**
0.450
(o.147)**
-5.063
(0.196)**
t372L
Respiratory
Illness
0.141
(o.o 74 )
0.243
(0.079)x*
0.433
(0.111)xx
0.198
(o.o8o) x
0.L32
(0.086)
-0.294
(0.101)*x
o.555
(o.og4) * *
-3.181
(0.096)**
L3729
Hearth
Attack
-o.402
(0.098)**
o.470
(0.111)**
0.910
(0.142)**
0.465
(0.116)x*
-0.068
(0.r22)
-0.173
-0.131
o.6L 1
(0.112;'r*
-3.919
(0.136)**
r3723
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at IOTo; ** significant at 57o; *** significant at tTo
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Appendix 3.3 Cont. : Palloni and Soldo (2002) replication, plus Mild and Severe Health
Conditions
Female
Age 6074
Age 75
Urban
Illiterate
Primary Education
Parents in Poor Health in Childhood
Constant
Observations
Stroke Arthritis or
Rheumatism
-0.119 0.584
(0.1 14) (0.047)**
0.549 0.584(0.129)** (0.048)**
0.880 0.824(0.163)** (0.069)**
0.257 0.014
(0.124) * (0.048)
0.261 0.007
(0" 126) * (0.053)
-0.870 -0.437(0.201)** (0.063)**
0.263 0.429(o.14O) (0.055) **
-4.r7L -2.109(0.153)** (0.060)**
13716 13715
Mild Health
Condition"
0.650
(0.036)**
0.516
(0.039)*x
0.594
(0.061)**
0.141
(0.039)*x
-0.119
(0.045)**
-0.428
(0.046)**
0.436
(o.o48) **
-0.542
(0.045)**
13739
Severe
Health Conditionb
0.099
(0.054)
0.298
(0.058)**
0.590
(0.081)**
0.244
(0.059)**
O.LL7
(0.064)
-0.189
(0.071)**
o.5L4
(o.063) **
-2.472
(0.071)**
13738
Standa.rd errors in parentheses
* significant at LOTo; *+ significant at 57o;*** significa.nt at 17o
d Mild Health Condition: hypertension, diabetes and arthritis
b Severe Health Condition: cancer or tumor, health attach, respiratory ilbress, respiratory illness
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